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The hypothesis put forward in this thesis is that 
intelligent behaviour is demonstrable in animals who are 
actively involved in the selection of significant information 
which is used to 'decide' on a course of action appropriate 
in the situation. It is further postulated that the 
evolution of this capacityis inevitable, given an input 
system capable of detecting a substantial portion of the 
vast amount of information inherent in the environment. 
The inductive nature of the active selection process is 
expressed in two different cognitive processes. The first, 
considered to be slower and less flexible than the other, 
is basically analytic in nature. The inductive nature of 
the process is expressed in the selection of elemental 
features assumed to define perceptual and conceptual cate-
gories and in the formation of 'rules' for the combination 
of those features. The second cognitive process is more 
flexible. Stimuli are classified on the basis of perceived 
similarity, and representations may be holistic in nature. 
The nature of the inductive process is expressed in the 
selection of significant information in the form of 
elemental features and configurations of elements. A 
greater ability for induction is required here because of 
the probabilistic nature of the categorization process. 
It is suggested that animals are classifiable into three 
categories, according to whether they only exhibit a passive 
(non-inductive) process of stimulus classification, the 
viii 
first cognitive process, or both cognitive propesses. 
I 
Where both processes are present, it is considered that 
the. flexibility of the system allows a greater potential 
for intelligent behaviour than is possible in a system 




The year 1859 was an epochal one for humanity. In 
that year, the distinction between human and animal became 
less clear. But although the basic idea of evolution is 
now commonly accepted, the fight to maintain human 
superiority has continued unabated. In spite of accumulating 
evidence against human uniqueness this assumption still 
underlies much thinking in social science. 
Today, the evidence is indisputable that humans, 
gorillas and chimpanzees share 99% of their DNA. The separation 
of the human line and that of the apes almost certainly 
occurred only 4.5 million years ago (Gribbin & Cherfas, 
1982). As scientists delve deeper into the molecular 
structure of animal life, the distinction between humans and 
other animals becomes increasingly hard to see. 
Accordingly, many instead try to find human uniqueness 
at the more gross, behavioural level. Yet it seems that 
here too, there is no ready answer. Man as the only tool-
using animal is a myth that has long since been destroyed. 
Language has always enjoyed considerable popularity, but 
it seems that the meaning of 'language' as something unique 
to humans has had to become increasingly restricted as 
examples of complex language abilities are demonstrated in 
other animals. 
Of course, it has always been popular to assume that 
it was 'intelligence' which separates human and non-human 
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animals. To some extent this is a self-fulfillitjg prophecy, 
since it seems that the meaning of intelligence is rooted in 
the·assumption that intelligence consists of those cognitive 
abilities which distinguish humankind. Even among those who 
purport to look for intelligence among non-human animals it 
is common to redefine 'intelligence' when it relates to non-
humans in a way that makes no explicit reference to cognitive 
processes. Thus, there seems to be a common assumption that, 
if one may talk about non-human animals being intelligent, 
then it is a different sort of intelligence than that 
evidenced by humans. 
This appears to be an assumption unsupported by any 
'hard' evidence. It particularly seems unwarranted when one 
considers that the nature of human intelligence is a question 
that still lacks a wholly satisfactory answer. To then 
assume that it is nevertheless unique, of a different order 
than animal intelligence, appears little more than 
anthropocentric bias. 
It is common today to talk about biological organisms 
as information-processing systems. Indeed, it is in terms 
of information-processing systems that we may view the 
evolution of life on this planet. As J.Z. Young says, 
" ... every form of life ... can continue to meet the 
demands of its varying environment if it shows adequate 
variety of actions and sufficient capacity to collect the 
information needed to act correctly. Each individual is 
able to do this by virtue of its particular range of sensory 
and motor capacities ... The pressure to acquire better sources 
of information and ways to adapt is thus itself a factor 
making for change ... New means of coping with the environment 
appear, involving greater complexity of organisation ... 
This increase of tnformation as to how to survive is the 
3 
main sense in which there has been progress during evolution." 
(Young, 1981) . 
It is in the terms of the development of increasingly 
complex information-processing systems, that the evolution of 
intelligent behaviour is considered here. 
Information processing systems may be looked at in 
terms of structure, prbcess and knowledge (Hunt, 1980). The 
I 
structural aspect concerns mechanistic capacities for storing, 
retrieving and transforming information. The application of 
these capacities in a particular and possibly highly flexible 
order, is the process aspect. The knowledge aspect concerns 
the co-ordination of the present situation with stored infor-
mation. Although both structure and knowledge clearly play an 
important role in determining the capabilities of the system, 
it is in the processing of the information - in the way in 
which raw data are integrated, classified and acted on - that 
the essence of intelligence lies. The evolution of 
intelligent behaviour is the evolution of processing methods. 
To justify this assertion, it is necessary to 
investigate research from several fields. We will start 
with a discussion of what is meant by 'intelligence' and 
~rorn there investigate the processes of human categorization. 
Although it is commonly assumed that the processes of 
perceptual and conceptual categorization are the same, it is 
clear that the nature of the human information-processing 
system is not wholly explicable by cognitive theory. 
Accordingly we must consider other levels of processing 
in humans. This information, together with cognitive 
4 
theory, allows us to consider a model of informatiotj 
processing which involves two fundamentally different 
cognitive processes. Studies of non-human animals provide 
the basis for a theory of how these processes evolved. 
5 
CHAPTER 2 
THE EVALUATION OF INTELLIGENT BEHAVIOUR 
2.1 IDEAS ON THE NATURE OF INTELLIGENCE 
What is understood by 'intelligence' is to a large 
extent a matter of definition. In common speech, it refers 
to the "ability to understand, reason and perceive; quickness 
in learning, mental alertness; ability to grasp relationships" 
(The Penguin English Dictionary). Traditionally, researchers 
in the field of human intelligence have attempted to more 
rigorously define the nature of intelligence by establishing 
those 'mental faculties' which presumably allow a person to 
demonstrate these abilities. Intelligence is thus seen as 
an attribute, or cluster of attributes, that is possessed in 
greater or lesser measure by individual humans. The principal 
issues within this approach have concerned the questions of 
(a) whether there is one 'general intelligence' property or a 
number of related problem-solving properties, and (b) the 
relative importance of genes and experience in determining 
the level of intelligence. 
The application of this viewpoint to the more general 
question of intelligence among animal species (note: 'animal' 
used unqualified always includes humans) - in particular, the 
question of whether intelligence is demonstrated by animals 
other than human - has resulted in an emphasis on artificial 
problem-solving tests in experimental studies. Another 
approach to intelligence however, has become increasingly 
popular in ethological research. 
6 
In this approach, one talks not of the 'dispositi~n' 
I 
of intelligence, but of the description of behaviour as 
intelligent. From this comes a conceptualisation of 
intelligence as an abstract characterization of the organism's 
behavioural responses to pressures from the environment 
(Hodos, l982). To quote Tuddenharn: 11 intelligence is not an 
entity, nor even a dimension in a person, but rather an 
evaluation of a behaviour sequence (or the average of many 
such), from the point of view of its adaptive adequacy. What 
constitutes intelligence depends upon what the situation 
demands .. " (Tuddenham, l963). We see this echoed in Jerison's 
(i973) description of intelligence as "plasticity in the face 
of a changing environment", and Bindra's (1976) definition of 
intelligent behaviour as "more purposive than haphazard, more 
intentional than accidental, and more foresightful and 
innovative than impulsive and stereotyped". 
This approach emphasises the observable characteristics 
of intelligent behaviour. It is no doubt considered by most 
ethologists that the 'cognitive' processes which may be 
presumed to underlie this behaviour, are simply not their 
concern. It is, however, the concern of this thesis, which 
takes a cognitive approach to the question of the evolution of 
intelligent behaviour. Thus, the writer follows the 
ethologists' view as regards the observable characteristics of 
intelligent behaviour, but looks to the 'common-sense' view 
of the nature of intelligence for pointers to the underlying 
cognitive processes. 
2.2 THE 'COMMON SENSE' VIEW OF INTELLIGENT BEHAVIOUR 
The behaviour of bringing plant material home for the 
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purpose! of growing fungi (a food of which you are particularly 
fond); of carefully tend\ng it, putting fertiliser on it, 
keeping it free of moulds - would you describe this behaviour 
as intelligent? 
The evaluation 6f behaviour as intelligent is often a 
function of the assumptions made about the organism involved. 
The behaviour described above could easily have been carried 
out by a human, and if you knew (or assumed) that this was in 
fact the case, you would have no hesitation in so evaluating 
it. However, if the writer informed you that the.behaviour 
described was in fact a characteristic behaviour of the leaf-
cutting ant, you would probably be equally certain that the 
behaviour was not intelligent. Why? Probably part of the 
reason is an anthropomorphic bias; but there are also 
important assumptions being made about the events underlying 
the behaviour. If a man behaves like this, there is a tendency 
to ascribe all sorts of qualities to the action - qualities 
involving purposiveness, judgement, choice, the ability to 
predict the consequences of his actions. On the other hand, 
we are reluctant to ascribe these qualities to an ant. In 
this case quite rightly, for despite the complexity of the 
behaviour, it can be clearly shown to be highly stereotyped, 
and dependent on simple orienting responses to key stimuli. 
An equally complex behaviour of quite a different order 
is exhibited by the female sand wasp. Before laying her eggs, 
she digs a burrow, covers the entrance, catches a caterpillar, 
brings the dead caterpillar back to the burrow, opens the 
entrance, takes the caterpillar to the chamber she has built 
at the bottom, and then lays her egg on the caterpilla~. She 
then leaves, seals the entrance, and does it all over again in 
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another place (each wasp simultaneously cares for 2 or 3 nerts). 
A few days later, she returns to each of her nests to inspect 
them. If necessary, she then brings the larva one to four 
caterpillars (as appropriate). The process is repeated once 
more before the wasp tightly seals her burrow. 
It seems clear that learning is involved here. However, 
the flexibility of this behaviour is quite limited. Baerends 
& Baerends (in a study reported by Tinbergen, 1968) found that 
although the wasp could adapt her behaviour (as regards the 
number of caterpillars brought to her nest) according to (a) 
the number of caterpillars in the nest when inspected; and 
(bl the size of the larva when inspected, she did not modify 
her behaviour if these factors were altered when she returned 
with the prey. Here it seems, is an example of "a complex 
interaction between instinct and learning in (which) the 
insect is "instinctively set" to encode and process complex, 
but precisely limited, bits of information" (Denny, 1980). 
It is the limits which would seem to preclude evaluating the 
behaviour as intelligent. 
These two examples demonstrate that complexity of 
behaviour is not a sufficient reason for the ascription of 
intelligence. Complex behaviour patterns may be built up 
from stereotyped motor responses to specific sensory stimuli 
(as with the leaf-cutting ant), and from the interaction of 
'instinctive' components with limited learning abilities (a 
borderline case, which we are nevertheless reluctant to term 
'intelligent'). A more formal study which was specifically 
designed to answer the question of whether a particular 
behaviour could be classed as 'intelligent', was carried out 
by Charles Darwin on earthworms (Darwin, 1904; reviewed by 
Reed, 19 8 2) . 
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The behaviour selected by Darwin for study was that of 
lini~g a burrow with leaves. Darwin observed that the 
h \ . eart worms typically grasped a leaf by its tip in order to 
pull it into the burrow. In general, this is in fact the 
best way of pulling a leaf into a worm's burrow. To demon-
strate whether this behaviour was intelligent or not, he ran 
a number of tests which were designed to examine the flexibility 
of the behaviour in responses to changing environmental factors. 
Specifically, he looked at three possible 'explanations' which 
he considered to be the alternatives to naming the behaviour 
'intelligent': "instinct", "habit" and "trial-and-error". 
Of these, "instinct" is the most important, because it is 
commonly regarded as the antithesis of intelligence. It is 
worth noting therefore, three predictions Darwin made concerning 
instincts: 
(_i) instincts are relatively invariant across a population, 
or across a sexual group within a population; 
(ii) instinctive behaviour might occur with little or no 
(iii) 
individual experience; and 
instinctive behaviour will be relatively inflexible 
with regards to changing environmental conditions. 
To test the flexibility of the behaviour with regard to 
changing environmental conditions, Darwin first ascertained 
that one of the adaptive values of burrow linings is temperature 
control, and then observed the behaviour under various tempera-
ture regimes. Results indicated that the leaf-pulling behaviour 
varied in appropriate ways with the alterations in temperature, 
where the most appropriate way is the one which results in 
the least cool air entering the burrow {in accordance with 
the predetermined 'purpose' of the behaviour). Where environ-
10 
mental conditions were such that burrow ~inings were 
unnecessary for warmth, far less selectivity as regards what 
\ 
area of the leaf was grasped, was demonstrated. I 
Further tests of the flexibility of this behaviour 
involved changing the stimulus - that is, the type of leaf. 
Using rhododendron leaves (which, unusually, tend to be 
narrower at the base than at the tip), it was found that worms 
pulled them by the base 66% of the time - a figure which 
compares almost precisely with Darwin's assessment of the 
proportion of leaves which would have gone in most easily by 
the base. (Note: Darwin regarded this as a test of whether 
the action was 'habitual', but the distinction between an 
'habitual' and an 'instinctive' behaviour is not one that is 
clear to the writer, and accordingly the question of 'habit' 
has been subsumed under that of 'instinct'.) 
To test whether some innate avoidance response to a 
specific cue (namely, that of 'points') was underlying this 
behaviour, Darwin used pine leaves as test stimuli. He found 
that when the points of the needles were removed, the worms 
still pulled the leaves by the base. This was true even when 
the two ends (pine leaves consist of two leaves joined at the 
basel were fastened together so that they could be pulled by the 
'tip' of the leaf. From this, Darwin concluded that the 
behaviour was not an avoidance response to a specific cue 
(please note that the question of the adequacy of the tests with 
regard to Darwin's conclusions is not a point at issue here). 
Finally, Darwin investigated whether this behaviour could 
be explained in terms of trial and error. Using paper tri-
angles which display by dirt and crease marks any attempts to 
pull them by areas other than the apex, it was found that in 
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less than 10% of the cases were the triangles grabbed first 
at some \ther locale - thus ruling out trial and error. 
The major points to note from Darwin's study are that: 
(i) he considered that the first requirement for an 
evaluation of behaviour as intelligent was to 
determine the adaptive significance of the behaviour; 
(ii) from this, the most appropriate way of carrying out 
the task was determined; 
(iii) the behaviour was observed in order to determine 
whether it was appropriate; 
(iv) the possibility of the animal happening on the most 
appropriate way by following instinct was examined 
step-by-step, by investigating (a) whether the 
behaviour varied as the changes in setting altered what 
was the most appropriate way of carrying out the task; 
(b) whether the behaviour resulted from an instinct 
relating to specific 'key stimuli'; and (c) whether 
the behaviour resulted from a process of trial-and-
error; and 
(v) Darwin considered that the results of his experi~ental 
study implied the involvement of attention, discrimina-
tion, choice and judgement in the earthworms' behaviour, 
and that this justified its evaluation as intelligent. 
It would seem then, that behaviour may be evaluated as 
intelligent when it has been shown to vary appropriately with 
changes in the environment such that the most appropriate 
way of carrying out the task is changed, where appropriateness 
is determined in light of the adaptive significance of the 
behaviour, and where the behaviour can be shown to be directed 
towards achieving some specific goal. This last requirement 
12 
refers to the apparent need for qualities spch as purposive-
ness, judgement, choice, and the ability to predict the 
\ 
I 
consequences of one's actions, to be involved in the behaviour 
(if it is to be evaluated as intelligent). That this is a 
required characteristic of intelligent behaviour may not yet 
be evident. The 'proof' of this assertion can only come from 
consideration of behaviours which we intuitively assess as 
'intelligent' or 'non-intelligent' - after all, it must be 
remembered that what intelligence is, is to a large extent 
definitional, hence unprovable. 
Homing behaviour is a good example because the objective 
of the behaviour is clear. It is also a behaviour which is 
demonstrated in a number of disparate types of animal, and 
shows an equally variable method of performance. 
In general, we can say that homing behaviours can fall 
into three categories: 
(i)_ it could depend on an internalized memory of the route 
or of a sequence of physical or chemical cues along 
numerous routes home; 
(ii) it could involve following a slime trail, chemical 
gradient, physical path etc; and 
( iii) it could result from no more than natural restrictions 
of topography. 
Now it seems unlikely that the last two categories could 
involve intelligent behaviour. The first category however, is 
worthy of closer study. While the precise mechanisms involved 
are far from fully understood, it is clear that some animals 
use visual landmarks in finding their way home. Can we say 
that this constitutes intelligent behaviour? The question 
arises - how does the recognition of such objects differ 
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from the use of, say, slime trails? The behaviour described 
in the seco\d categqry is similar.to the behaviour of male 
silkmoths in finding their mates. The male silkmoth responds 
(by vibrating his wings) to contact with molecules of a 
chemical substance produced by the sex organs of a ripe female. 
The moth orients to the wind direction, and keeps flying into 
the wind for as long as he receives the stimulus input. In 
other words, the behaviour is a simple response to stimuli 
which trigger receptors designed specifically to respond to 
that type of stimulus. The difference between that type of 
response and a response to a visual landmark would appear to 
chiefly reside in two factors: the nature of the stimulus; 
and the use of memory and learning. 
It would seem evident that environmental landmarks 
(essentially temporary in nature) could hardly form part of an 
animal's genetic inheritance - they must be learned. And 
indeed, it has been demonstrated that ducks and geese, for 
example, transmit such information from generation to 
generation (Young, 1981). 
If then, such behaviour involves learning and memory, 
does this necessitate it being called intelligent? Although 
we tend to regard learning and memory as necessary for 
intelligent behaviour, we are still reluctant to name behaviour 
as intelligent merely on the evidence that such phenomena are 
involved (witness the sand wasp). Something more is needed, 
to do with our terms "reason", "judgement", "choice". What 
is it that we are basing our (largely intuitive) notion of 
intelligent behaviour on? 
2.3 THE UNACKNOWLEDGED ASSUMPTION 
It has been common to assume that 'lower' animals 
'discriminate' while humans 'conceptualise' or 'abstract'. 
The difference in terminology makes apriori assumptions 
concerning the respective mental capacities of animals and 
humans, but is there in fact a behavioural distinction? 
What does it mean to 'abstract'? The term indicates a 
process of taking something out; the implication is that 
humans categorise objects by picking out specific features 
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or attributes of the object and comparing them with some 
'concept' (which may be a list of attributes or a network of 
elements in specified relationship, or something else) stored 
by the organism. To 'discriminate', on the other hand, simply 
means to act on the basis of there being a difference between 
two or more objects (note: the verb is also often used to 
refer to the process underlying the behaviour, but here it 
shall be used only in its former meaning). It is clear that 
the word involves no assumptions about what is involved at 
a cognitive level. 
This difference in terminology appears to reflect the 
common and long-standing belief that the essential characteris-
tic distinguishing human from other animal species is 
intelligence. The rationale for the distinction however, 
would appear to be found in the perception of a difference in 
the complexity of human and non-human information-processing 
systems. That is, the justification for the distinction is 
found in the assumption that humans use an active process in 
selecting relevant information, while other animals use a 
passive process. (Please note that it is not the writer's 
contention that this assumption is justified, nor that it is 
15 
one held by all researchers - merely that it seems to be the 
only way to m~ke sense of the different approaches to human 
\ . 
and non-humanlprocessing systems.) 
This point may be clarified by consideration of the 
concepts of 1top-down' and 'bottom-up' processing. Bottom-up, 
or data-driven, processing is a reductionist concept - detectors 
identify features, features combine to form patterns; patterns 
combine to form more complex concepts. On the other hand, 
top-down or conceptually driven processing, involves the 
perceiver more actively in the process, by imposing its own 
knowledge and conceptual structures on the signals being 
received from the environment. It seems clear (see Anderson, 
19801, that the amount of processing required in a pure bottom-
up system, and the 'noisiness' and unreliability of sensory 
signals, necessitates some top-down processing (given a system 
capable of detecting a significant amount of the vast array 
of sensory data inherent in the environment). 
Thus, the fine discrimination of which a human is 
capable clearly requires a sensory system capable of detecting, 
and discriminating between, a vast number of stimuli, and this 
requires a more active selection process than is explicit in 
bottom-up, feature-detector approach. 
That is, it is contended that what is understood by the 
term 'intelligence' is partly a result of the belief that it 
is an attribute of humans rather than animals in general, and 
that its essence lies in the assumption that humans have 
choices in their course of action, and their selection of the 
appropriate behaviour is in some way different from that 
demonstrated in non-human species. The writer is forced to 
conclude that this difference lies in some assumed distinction 
of an 'active' vs a 'passive' process. 
16 
The natture of this 
I 
active process is discussed in the next chapter. 
2.4 SUMMARY 
It has been said that the ascription of intelligence to 
specific behaviours is determined partly by the flexibility 
and appropriateness of the behaviour, and partly by the judge-
ment that (a) the behaviour is selected by the organism from 
a number of courses of action that are equally possible, and 
(bl this choice is based on the organism's judgement that it 
is the most adaptive response available in the circumstances. 
It has been contended that the level of appropriate variability 
needed for an evaluation of behaviour as intelligent, requires 
a considerable amount of information to be processed by the 
organism - information which includes that previously acquired, 
as well as that inherent in the situation - and that the 
processing of such an amount of information requires the 
active selection of significant information. Hence the 
conclusion that the (unrecognized) basis for the ascription 
of intelligence to behaviour, is the judgement that the 
organism is actively selecting the body of information (stored 






CATEGORIZATION PROCESSES IN HUMANS 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
This thesis is concerned with the evolution of 
intelligent behaviour. It has been .suggested (in the 
preceding chapter} that the essential characteristic of 
intelligent behaviour is the process by which the organism 
selects what information is significant. This aspect of the 
information-processing system is clearly a 'cognitive' one, 
and it is within the context of cognitive theory that a 
basic distinction in the evolution of intelligent behaviour, 
is suggested. Although the nature of the selection process 
is best displayed at lower levels of perceptual processing 
(the subject of the next chapter), the basic distinction 
in cognitive processes requires an understanding of the 
processes by which animals identify and classify complex 
stimuli. 
The objectives of this chapter are: 
li) to provide indire~t support for an assumption that the 
nature of the selection process underlying intelligent 
behaviour is inductive; 
liil to outline the theoretical structure of human 
categorization research, so that we may later 
discuss examples of animal behaviour within this 
context; 
( iii) to demonstrate the ipadequacies of the co~nitive 
! 
models so far postulated; 
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(iv) to suggest a solution to the problems, and re-examine 
the models in the light of that solution; and 
Cv) to construct two 'prototypical' theories which are 
characterized only by a few general assumptions, and 
which in their generality will provide the opposing 
cognitive processes contended to underlie intelligent 
behaviour. 
3.2 THE INDUCTIVE SELECTION PROCESS 
3.2.l The Nature of the Active Selection Process 
The difference between a passive and an active selection 
process alluded to in the previous chapter, is not one which 
can be easily defined. As it stands, the distinction does 
not appear to be a useful one. Some rather more specific 
characteristic of the selection process appears to be required. 
What this might be is suggested by Premack's (1978) distinction 
between the types of abstractness demonstrated by non-human 
(or at least non-primate) species and humans: "Although we 
are inclined to reserve abstraction for more complex relations, 
'darker than' and other comparably simple relations are 
already abstractions ... (but) a speech rule and a prototype 
are forms of abstraction that rely on many exemplars ... (while) 
one could learn to approach the darker side of an object on 
the basis of one exemplar". That is, as he goes on to say, 
such simple relational concepts are primitives, not induced 
like prototypes and rules. 
It is the writer's contention that the difference 
between human and non-human processing systems that is implicit 
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in the different approaches (referred to in 2.3) lies in this 
concept of inferfnce or induction. That is, humans infer 
significant information, while other animals can not. Thus, 
the nature of intelligence - the unacknowledged assumption 
which appears to contain the essence of what is meant by 
'intelligence' - is the inductive processing of information. 
Intelligence is the ability to infer what is significant. 
It is on the basis of this contenti~n, that the 
theoretical structure contained within this thesis is 
constructed. It is the fundamental assumption - thus, in 
practice unprovable. The justification for it must come 
from the internal consistency of the theoretical structure 
which derives from it; from its usefulness; and from its 
compatibility with other theoretical and empirical research. 
A very brief review of some of the empirical research which 
supports the assumption of an active selection process, and 
is suggestive of inductive processing, is given below. 
3.2.2 Empirical Support for an Assumption of Inductive 
Processing 
That perception, in humans at least, is much more than 
the simple registering of sensory information, is clearly 
indicated by cases of selective processing failures as a 
result of brain damage (see, for example, Benson & Greenberg, 
1969}. Moreover, a number of studies of visual and auditory 
information processing indicate the existence of brief 
sensory stores which hold all the information in the visual 
or auditory displays, and from which the information for 
further processing is selected (see Anderson, 1980 for a 
review of this evidence). It is clear that attention plays 
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an important role in selecting this information, anp that the 
selection of what to attend to, is partly determined by what 
features of the situation are considered significant by the 
perceiver - in particular, by the nature of the task (see, 
for example, Moray, 1959). 
Furthermore, it is clear that contextual information 
is important, not only in determining what information is 
significant, but also in the accurate recognition of complex 
stimuli, such as speech (see, for example, Miller & Nicely, 
1~55). It seems evident that, even if it is conceded that 
any pattern is conclusively identifiable by reference to its 
features, in many circumstances only some of its features 
will be identifiable, thus requiring the perceiver to use 
contextual cues in identifying the pattern. However, 
consideration of complex stimuli such as letters (and it is 
worth noting in passing that the complexity of letters lies 
in their use and meaningfulness, rather than their appearance) 
makes it clear that contextual information is often necessary 
for accurate identification even when all the features are 
readily perceptible. 
The role of attention and the importance of contextual 
information, are suggestive of a process of induction; but 
the principal justification for the assumption - apart from 
theoretical considerations - is found in the evidence that 
task variables partly determine what information is considered 
significant. 
3.3 REVIEW OF HUMAN CATEGORIZATION THEORIES 
The majority of theories of categorization can be 
considered to fall into one of three types (or mixture of 
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these): the classical definitional approach, the probabilistic 
view, and the exemplar view. (Note: classification of 
categorization mode~s varies among researchers; I am here 
following Smith & Medin, 1981.) Discussion of these theories 
will be in the context of this classification. 
A glossary of the more important terms common in this 
research can be found at the end of this chapter. It should 
be noted that use of some of these terms is not wholly 
consistent among researchers, and the specific meaning of a 
term in the context of this discussion is explained in this 
glossary. 
3.3.l The Classical or Definitional Approach 
The definitional approach has its roots in British 
empirical psychology - in the belief that a human starts life 
with a blank mind and associations between stimuli are formed 
entirely arbitrarily by experience. From this come three 
properties of categories assumed in this approach: 
(il arbitrariness of category formation; 
Cii) equivalence of category members (i.e. each member of 
a category is equally representative of that 
category); and 
(~ii} determinacy of category boundaries (i.e. the distinction 
between one category and any others is clear-cut). 
The second fundamental assumption of importance which 
underlies the definitional approach, is that concerning the 
nature of processing systems - that they are hierarchical 
and analytic. More specifically, as it relates to categoriza-
tion, it is assumed that categories are ultimately defined in 
terms of elemental features, which are independently processed, 
and to which single units within the processing systejn are 
responsive. 
The essential characteristics of the definitional 
approach are that a concept is represented by a summary 
description of the category, which applies to all members, 
but which need not correspond to any specific insta·nce. 
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This summary description is composed of a set of features, 
each of which is singly necessary and jointly sufficient, 
and a set of rules for their combination. Thus membership 
in a category is all-or-none. A concept's defining features 
are assumed to be nested in superordinate categories, thus 
forming a hierarchy. 
(a) Criticisms of the Definitional Approach 
Consequent upon the belief that membership in a 
category is determined on the basis of singly necessary and 
jointly sufficient defining features, it follows that no 
exemplar of a concept should be more representative of that 
concept than any other, and that boundaries between categories 
should be clear-cut. 
Much of the claim against the definitional view comes 
from the considerable body of experimental evidence for 
graded responses to category members - evidence that people 
judge items as being more or less typical or representative 
of a category; that they judge more typical items more 
accurately; and that they classify them faster. There is 
also good evidence that children learn typical exemplars 
before atypical ones, and when retrieving category members, 
people assess typical instances before atypical ones (Mervis 
& Rosch, 198l). 
The assumption of clear-cut category boundaries is also 
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ch~llenged by experimental evidence. Not only are people 
often uncertain about'.which category certain objects belong 
to, but there are oft~n disagreements regarding category 
judgements between subjects as well as within subjects across 
time and/or context. 
When people are asked to list attributes of exemplars, 
they mostly list properties that are not true of all the 
exempla~s in the class, implying that non-necessary properties 
are being used to determine category membership (moreover 
the attributes listed are also highly correlated with 
typicality). This problem reflects what is perhaps the most 
telling argument against definitional theory, namely that, 
despite decades of searching, researchers have totally 
failed to come up with a set of defining features for most 
object categories. 
Finally, the classical view assumes a nesting of 
concepts such that a specific concept (e.g. 'dog') includes 
all the properties of its superordinate (e.g. 'mammal'), 
which in turn includes all the properties of its superordinate 
(e.g. 'animal'). Thus the specific concept will have more 
common properties and fewer distinctive ones with its 
immediate superordinate than its more distant one. It 
follows from many theories of similarity that the specific 
concept should always be judged more similar to an immediate 
superordinate than to a distant one. In practice however, a 
number of exceptions can be found. 
Taken separately, none of these criticisms is a decisive 
challenge to the definitional approach. Some theorists, for 
example, argue that the 'fuzziness' of category boundaries 
results from the nature of cognitive processes and does not 
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reflect category structure. Moreover, the value of th~ 
i 
evidence for member gradedness assumes that if categories 
were definitional, graded responses would not be recorded. 
This assumption was recently challenged (Armstrong, Gleitman 
& Gleitman, 1983) when graded responses were found for 
categories that have been assumed to be well-defined (for 
details of this study, see 3.3.4 below). More than one 
interpretation of these results is possible but, as Martin 
& Caramazza (1981) note, differences in reaction time might 
be found for well-defined categories if the component 
properties varied continuously rather than discretely. It 
must be conceded that graded responses are at least not 
conclusive evidence for a probabilistic structure of concepts. 
However, the total body of evidence makes a compelling 
argument against a simple definitional theory of concept 
description, and the rest of ·the chapter will concentrate on 
the alternatives to the definitional approach. 
(b) Summary 
In the definitional approach, a concept is represented 
by a summary description, which consists of a set of singly 
necessary and jointly sufficient component properties. The 
chief challenge to this view comes from the extensive 
experimental evidence for the graded representativeness of 
category members, and the failure to identify defining 
features for most object categories. Other important 
evidence against it includes: 
(i) evidence for the 'fuzziness' of category boundaries; 
(ii) indications that non-necessary component properties 
are used in determining category membership; 
( iii,) evidence that children learn more typical exemplars 
first, and that,more typical exemplars are assessed 
before atypical \ones; and 
(iv) examples of concepts sharing more properties with a 
distant superordinate than with the immediate one, 
{from Mervis & Rosch, 1981). 
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However, it is possible to argue that graded responses 
to exemplars of a category are not evidence against the 
definitional approach; and that the 'fuzziness' of boundaries 
reflects the processes of categorization rather than the 
actual structure of the concepts. 
3.3.2 The Probabilistic Approach 
The probabilisitc view differs from the definitional 
view in that it assumes that instances of a concept vary in 
the degree to which they share certain properties, and 
consequently vary in the degree to which they are representa-
tive of the concept. Probabilistic theories have in common 
the view that a concept is a measure of central tendency 
(mean or mode, according to dimensional and featural models 
respectively}, and that exemplars of a category vary in the 
degree to which they are representative of the category. 
The movement away from a definitional approach towards 
a probabilistic one was mediated by the belief that, even if 
there were defining components, there were no rules for their 
combination. Thus it is not so much the idea of necessary 
components (which are allowable within a probabilistic approach, 
in conjunction with characteristic components) but the require-
ment of rules, (which are necessitated by an assumption of 
necessary and sufficient components, if top-down processing 
is presumed), that is at the root of the reaction agains~ 
the classical approach. 
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Typically, the summary representation that describes 
the concept in the probabilistic approach, is a list of 
attributes that are characteristic rather than defining, that 
is, a property achieves inclusion by having a substantial 
probability of occurring in instances of the concept. An 
object is then categorized on the basis of possessing some 
criterial number of properties, or sum of weighted properties. 
Thus an object is categorized on the basis of some assessed 
similarity to the summary representation rather than by 
applying some definition. Implicit in this view is the 
assumption that the summary representation is the result of 
an abstraction process, and is not necessarily realizable as 
an instance. 
From this starting point however, the range of 
possibilities is wide. One broad distinction that can be 
made between the various probabilistic models is on the 
basis of whether the comparison process uses features, 
dimensions, or holi~tic patterns (see 3.4.1 for a discussion 
of these distinctions). 
(_a)_ Featural Theories 
The essential characteristic of this class of theories 
is that non-necessary and modal features are accompanied by 
weights reflecting their combined salience and conditional 
probability. Thus, the summary representation is assumed to 
consist of salient features that have a substantial probability 
of occurring in instances of the concept. This general 
featural theory is typified by frequency models, of which 
there are two basic types: 
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(a} Simple frequency models, which assume a stimulus is 
assigned to a cat'fgory on the basis of summing the 
I 
frequency with which each of the attributes have been 
associated with each of the categories and selecting 
the category with the highest sum; or 
(bl Relational frequency models, which differ from simple 
frequency models in that, in addition to recording the 
trequency with which features are associated with 
categories, the frequencies with which features are 
associated together are also recorded. 
A considerable body of experimental evidence exists 
which is taken to support frequency models. The main points 
are: 
(i) evidence that subjects can correctly estimate the 
relative frequencies of features; 
(ii) evidence that they use this information by sampling 
features with high relative frequency; 
(_iii) evidence that the frequency score (summation of the 
component frequencies} provides the basis for classifying 
stimuli; and 
(iv) evidence that the frequency score is used in forming 
prototypes, (from Kellogg, 1981). 
(b) Dimensional Theories 
Dimensional theories assume that values along any 
dimension are used to represent a concept, and, similarly 
to featural theories, are tagged with weights reflecting 
conditional probability; each concept is described by the 
average values of the dimensions (as opposed to the modal 
features). Most dimensional models also assume that concepts 
having the same relevant dimensions can be represented as 
points in multidimensional space. 
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Examples of dimensional models include: 
(a) Prototype-distance models, which assume a stimulus is 
assigned to a category on the basis of which prototype 
is closest to the stimulus, where distance is measured 
by summing the distances along each component dimension, 
and (in many models) where the distances from the 
various dimensions are differentially weighted for 
salience. 
(bl Average distance models, which classify stimuli on the 
basis of which stored pattern has the smallest average 
distance from the stimulus. 
(cl Cue validity models, which classify stimuli on the basis 
of summing the validity information from the component 
dimensions and comparing this with learned information 
regarding which values on individual dimensions are 
predictive of category membership. 
(c) Criticisms of the Probabilistic Approach 
The probabilistic approach was tailored to answer the 
problems which have plagued the classical view, and clearly 
the theories subsumed under this heading have no trouble 
accounting for typicality effects,which are readily seen as 
resulting from the differential similarity of exemplars to 
the prototype. The use of non-necessary properties is 
entirely compatible with the notion of characteristic rather 
than defining features. The inability to determine defining 
properties is no problem, for they don't exist. And because 
nothing in principle prevents a concept from sharing more 
properties with a distant superordinate than with the 
immediate one, the view is consistent with similarity judge-
ments for nested concepts. 
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Tpe probabilistic view however, has its own problems. 
The first and most obvious, is that while probabilistic 
theories get around the prJblem of having to find defining 
features, they are still left with the problem of features 
themselves. This problem relates to any theory which involves 
a decompositional approach (as opposed to an holistic one). 
No decompositional theory has yet found some way of 
putting constraints on what features may be posited, if they 
are not defined in terms of single unit responsivity. With 
no constraints, "the argument is standard and irrefutable 
that there's no end to the descriptions that can apply to 
any one stimulus or to all or some of its parts", (Armstrong, 
Gleitman & Gleitman, 1983). The value of probabilistic 
theory is considerably lessened by its failure to specify the 
basis of the feature set, or even to show some likelihood of 
the numbers of needed features being less than the numbers of 
lexical items. 
Furthermore, featural theories cannot explain how 
people know about the range of values a property may have; 
a degree of allowable latitude must be built into each encoded 
feature or identification of features would be too discrimina-
tory to be functional in the real world. And while it is 
clear that certain characteristic features of particular 
concepts are highly correlated with other features, (e.g. 
birds are typically small and typically sing, but big birds 
are unlikely to sing), and evidence suggests that people use 
knowledge about correlated attributes when categorizing, 
this is not explained in the context of featural theories. 
Finally, featural theories have not yet been shown to account 
for context effects. 
30 
The only advantage that dimensional theories have, 
with regard to these problems, is that continuous representa-
tion of component properties allows the representation of 
the variability permissable to a property. 
Cd) Summary 
The probabilistic approach is characterised by the 
assumption that a concept is represented by a summary 
description, which consists of a set of component properties 
that have a substantial probability of occurring in instances 
of a concept, and that this concept is a measure of central 
tendency. Category judgements are thus made on the basis of 
an object's similarity to the description, not (as in the 
definitional approach) on the basis of applying some 
definition. 
Probabilist~c models may be classified according to 
whether they us~ features or dimensions as the component 
properties of a concept, or whether they use an holistic 
approach. Although it is clear that holistic processing is 
used in human cognition (see 4.2.1) holistic models are 
rare, chiefly because of the difficulties in finding some way 
to assess the similarity of two objects or patterns without 
breaking them down (but see 3.4.1 for discussion of this 
point}. Moreover, because holistic models assume a one-to-
one relationship between words and concepts, an holistic 
approach would in theory greatly expand the number of 
concepts required to be stored. 
Consequently, most theories take a decompositional 
approach. Decompositional probabilistic models fall into 
two categories - ones which are based on modal features, 
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and ones ba~ed on the mean values of dimensions. Within these 
categories, models can be fur\her classified according to the 
method used to assess similarity. 
One of the principal criticisms to this approach 
centres around the lack of constraints on component properties. 
Because of the failure to account for most object categories 
in terms of sensory properties, the problem has been to find 
some set of defining principles which specify what constitutes 
a component property. Without such principles, the situation 
results in (a) the number of component properties being no 
less than the number of concepts would be in an holistic 
approach; (b) the difference between a concept and a component 
property being purely one of level of discussion; and (c) 
concepts/components being defined in terms of themselves. 
Other general criticisms of decompositional probabilistic 
models are that they have failed to account for: 




correlation of components; 
context effects. 
and 
The approach has however, satisfactorily accounted for the 
problems which plagued the definitional approach. 
3.3.3 Exemplar Models 
The probabilistic and definitional approaches have in 
common the lack of requirement for any instance of a class to 
exactly match the stored representation (note: although 
component properties are singly necessary and jointly 
sufficient in the definitional approach, instances of a class 
32 
will usually have additional components which are irrelevant 
in judging its category membership). The exemplar approach 
on the other hand, while agreeing with the claim that concepts 
need not contain defining features, holds that the representa-
tion of a concept consists of separate descriptions of some 
of its exemplars, and that there is no single representation. 
Thus exemplar models involve a substantially greater lack of 
abstraction than is involved in the representations based on 
either the definitional or the probabilistic views. 
Exemplar models can differ from each other in essentials 
significantly - some permit representations with no specific 
instances, others do not; in some assessing different 
exemplars for different stimuli is allowable, while in others 
it is not. What exemplar models do have in common is the idea 
that categorization of an object relies on comparisons of 
that object to known exemplars of the category. 
It is clear that the possible methods of assessing 
similarity mirror those discussed under probabilistic models. 
However, it is worth noting that the models discussed so far 
have consistently calculated overall similarity by the sum 
of similarities for each component property (i.e. additive 
combination), while another possibility (as in Medin & 
Schaffer's context model, 1978) is to use the product of 
similarities (i.e. multiplicative combination). 
(al Comparison with the Probabilistic Approach 
Because of the variation among exemplar models and 
because they, like probabilistic models, have been derived 
from the assumption that members of a category vary in their 
similarity to the concept, the distinction between the two 
classes of theories is not always clear. Following Smith & 
33 
Medin (1981} !however, we can state that the essential distinc-
tion is one of disjunctiveness.\ 
The characteristic of disjunctiveness in fact 
distinguishes the definitional approach from both probabilis-
tic and exemplar views, in that concepts in the former 
approach are not at all disjunctive, while in the latter two 
views they are at least partially disjunctive (note: in a 
totally disjunctive concept instances need not have any 
features in common; in a partially disjunctive concept any 
two instances must share some features). Probabilistic models 
however, are implicitly disjunctive, while exemplar models 
are explicitly disjunctive. That is, because there is a 
single summary representation, the different disjuncts in 
probabilistic models exist only during the categorization 
process, while in the exemplar view the disjuncts correspond 
to the stored exemplars. 
Consequent upon this, one may note a further three 
differences between the approaches, which may be taken as 
characteristic rather than defining as they are not always 
true for each model. The first of these concerns the degree 
of retrieval, in that some exemplar models claim that the 
same representation is not always retrieved in decisions about 
category membership. The notion of partial retrieval could 
however, be included into probabilistic models; indeed, it 
might allow them to deal with the apparent instability of 
concepts and help explain some context effects. Secondly, 
in some exemplar models, all representations are realizable 
as specific instances, while in the probabilistic approach 
they are not necessarily so. Thirdly, in the exemplar 
approach, a property can be part of a representation if it 
is characteristic of a single instance, while in the 
probabilistic view, only component properties with a 
certain degree of commonality are included. 
(b) Criticisms of the Exemplar Approach 
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There is a considerable amount of experimental evidence 
for the use of exemplars in category judgements (see, for 
example, Medin & Schaffer, 1978; Brooks; 1978, and Homa, 
Sterling & Trepel, 1981). Like the probabilistic approach, 
the looseness of the exemplar approach enables it to 
adequately handle the problems of the definitional view. It 
also has some advantages over the probabilistic approach in 
that exemplars can carry information regarding the range of 
values for a property, and the correlations among properties. 
However, the lack of constraints on what component properties 
make up a concept or even what constitutes a concept, is 
even greater than in the probabilistic approach. 
Moreover, the representation of a concept by a dis-
junction of exemplars creates two major problems: the lack 
of any relationship between different exemplars of a concept; 
and the implication that when summary information is learned 
(e.g. when you learn that "all birds lay eggs"), this must 
be stored separately with each stored exemplar. These problems 
can be solved however, within the exemplar approach, by the 
inclusion of some form of summary representation (see, for 
example, Whitney & Kellas, 1984, for experimental support 
for the claim that both specific exemplars and summary repres-
entations are required for category decisions). 
(c) Summary 
Exemplar models are characterized by the assumption 
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that a conceptlis represented by separate descriptions of 
some of its exemplars. There is \o single summary representa-
tion. Methods of assessing the similarity of the object-to-
be~categorized to stored exemplars of a category are the same 
as those possible in a probabilistic model. 
While exemplar models handle those issues which are 
problems to the definitional approach, it tends to share the 
problems of the probabilistic approach. They can, however, 
better deal with the issue of the correlations among 
component properties, and that of the range of values 
permissable to a component property. On the minus side, there 
are the problems caused by representing a concept by a 
disjunction of exemplars, with no summary representation. 
3.3.4 Alternative Models 
A dual theory hypothesising that concepts are described 
by both a core description, which relates to the compositional 
meaning, and an identification procedure, which is an 
heuristic for picking out exemplars in the real world, has 
become increasingly popular among cognitive theorists. Many 
of the experimental results that challenge probabilistic 
models may be solved by theorising that categories have a 
classical conceptual core as well as identification procedures 
which have a probabilistic structure. The study by Armstrong, 
Gleitman & Gleitman (1983) for example, could be taken as· 
support for the dual theory. In this study, objects from 
supposedly probabilistic categories (sport, vehicle, fruit, 
and vegetable), i.e. those for which graded responses have 
consistently been recorded, were used as stimuli together 
with examples of categories generally supposed to be well-
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defined (.odd number, even number, female and plane geometry 
figure). The authors reported that exemplar rating and 
reaction time tests showed graded responses for both ill-
and well-defined categories. While they suggest that this 
may mean that graded responses do not directly reflect the 
structure of concepts, they also acknowledge that the results 
would support the view that there is an 'identification 
function' which is used to make a rapid sort of data, and 
which is probabilistic in. structure, and a 'conceptual core' 
which determines category membership on the basis of necessary 
and sufficient component properties. 
Likewise, the (1981) study by Osherson & Smith, which 
demonstrated that probabilistic theory could not account for 
conceptual combination or truth conditions, could be taken as 
indicating that probabilistic theory is only about a limited 
aspect of concepts - that conceptual combination and truth 
conditions of thoughts are tasks for the conceptual core. 
However, to restrict a probabilistic organisation to only 
part of the structure of the concept does not answer the 
theoretical problems which have been discussed as inherent in 
decompositional probabilistic theories. Nor does restricting 
the definitional approach to the core of the concept assist 
much in finding those defining components. Although massive 
effort has gone into the task {see, for example, Fodor & 
Katz, 1963; and Katz, 1972; 1977), it now seems likely that 
even reasonably definitional concepts cannot be made to break 
down into defining components {see Fodor, Garrett, Walker 
& Parkes, 1980, for a demonstration that even 'bachelor' is 
not decomposable). 
Another possibility is that of a theory which combines 
37 
two of these apptoaches in a rather different way. Two 
experimental results - the improvem\nt in classification of 
novel stimuli in later transfer tests following an increase 
in the number of exemplars during the learning phase; and 
the decreasing probability that a new stimulus will be 
categorized by its similarity to an old stimulus when 
category size is increased and the transfer test delayed -
have been taken as support for the hypothesis that, in the 
early stages of development, a concept is represented 
primarily by a few exemplars, but that it becomes increasing-
ly represented by its central tendency (prototype) and range 
(see Homa, Sterling & Trepel, 1981). 
3.4 THE NATURE OF THE 'FEATURE' 
3.4.1 The Holistic vs the Decompositional Approach 
The holistic approach to categorization centres on the 
assumption of a one-to-one relationship between words and 
mental categories, e.g. the word 'dog' is matched with a 
category 'dog', which is unanalyzable. 
The only clearly holistic approach that has been 
systematically developed is that of a template, which may be 
summarised as a gestalt, isomorphic to the real world, 
unanalyzable, and inherently relational. 
The main reason for the neglect of this approach can be 
found in two arguments: (i) that an holistic approach would 
require an immense amount of unanalyzable concepts to be 
stored; and (ii) the difficulty in giving a satisfactory 
account of precisely how the matching of stored pattern to 
real-world object is done. 
In contrast, the essence of decompositional theories 
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is that they try to limit the set of elementary discriminations 
required to be stored, by assuming that, e.g. categories such 
as 'dog' are made up of bundles of simpler categories called 
features. When the decompositional assumption was first 
postulated, it was assumed that these elemental features were 
sensory in nature. However, it has proven impossible in 
practice to determine a list of purely sensory features which 
adequately describe any object category (see Miller & Johnson-
Laird, 1976, for demonstration of this). Component properties 
suggested often seem no less complex than the categories they 
supposedly make up and what is in one context a component 
property, may in another context be a concept. 
This indeed, is the major problem for all the theories 
discussed. In the definitional approach, the nature of the 
feature might in principle be clearly defined, but in practise 
no such features can be identified. In the decompositional 
probabilistic and exemplar models, the failure to establish 
adequate constraints on features, and the difficulty in 
finding features which are significantly simpler than the 
concepts they supposedly describe, are major inadequacies. 
The whole value of the notion of component properties 
clearly rests in the constraints put on them. Ideally of 
course, one of the constraints should be that component 
properties are not themselves decomposable. Failing this 
however, the set of components should at least reveal many 
of the relations between concepts (e.g. the use of 'female' 
as a component makes evident one of the relationships between, 
say, the concepts of 'girl' and 'cow'). (Note that component-
sets which reveal all of the relationships between concepts 
would be made up of primitive, i.e. non-decomposable, 
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components). To b~ useful, components should clearly also 
have some generality. Finally, and most critically, the 
components must serve as the inputs fbr category judgements 
(this is, after all, implicit in the concept of component 
properties). 
The lack of constraints on the feature sets, and the 
difficulty in finding features that can be described in terms 
significantly simpler than the terms they supposedly help 
define, considerably weakens the argument that holistic 
systems would require too many stored representations. 
However, it seems that these problems are perceived as 
'easier•· than those found when the assumption of independently 
processable elemental features is discarded. That is, most 
researchers seem to prefer these problems to the problem of 
how stored patterns are compared to real-world objects if 
they are not analyzable. 
3.4.2 The Feature Redefined 
It is the writer's contention that the nature of the 
feature is not properly a question for cognitive theorists, 
except in so far as they need to understand what it is. But 
the problem would seem to be a matter for researchers into 
lower levels of perceptual processing. The evidence from 
these studies is discussed in the next chapter. At this point, 
it is necessary to offer a redefinition of feature without 
justification, in order to note its implications for categor-
ization models. 
The redefinition suggested is that a feature is an 
elemental holistic percept, whose component properties cannot 
be independently processed and later combined, because such 
an analytic process would lose significant information. 
40 
Because what constitutes a loss of significant information is 
plainly task-variable, what constitutes a 'feature' is very 
flexible. In other words, what constitutes a feature is 
something about which no hard-and-fast rules may be set, but 
instead is answered empirically, on the basis of the require-
ments of the information-processing system given the task. 
It may appear that there is a lack of constraint on 
what constitutes a feature that is no better than that apparent 
in decompositional probabilistic models; that this is not 
the case is a demonstration that, again, will have to wait 
for the next chapter. The important point here, is that 
this redefinition allows features to be configurations of 
elements. 
Thus this redefinition allows the issues of the 
correlation of components and the importance of contextual 
information to be answered - at the level of structure not 
process. It also becomes clear that more complex concepts can 
be formed from simpler ones, without being predictable from 
them - because the elemental holistic percept of any concept 
is a function of what aspects of the configuration of elements 
can be disregarded without loss of significant information. 
Thus the nesting concept of the definitional approach is 
challenged, and explanation offered for the exceptions to the 
rule that a specific concept is always judged more similar to 
an immediate superordinate than a distant one. Moreover, the 
challenge to the probabilistic approach on the basis that it 
fails to account for the way simple concepts combine to form 
complex ones, is answered at the level of structure and not 
process. 
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3.5 THE 'PROTOTYP1CAL' CATEGORISATION MODELS 
In summary then, we can point to\two fundamentally 
different approaches in human categorization research (note: 
I do not suggest that every model possesses all the character-
istics of one or other approach as I describe them here; but 
these appear to be the 'prototypical' views which reflect a 
very basic distinction in fundamental assumptions being made) 
(l) the view that a set of defining features and rules for 
their combination describes a concept/category; that 
the relationship between members of a category is found 
in the arbitrary associations of stimuli occurring in 
the perceiver's experience; that concepts are nested 
in a hierarchy such that any subordinate concept is 
nested within its superordinate; and that the 'elemental 
features' which are presumed to be isomorphic with 
single units in the input system (see 4.3.1 for 
discussion of this point), can be independently 
processed; and 
(2} the view that a concept is described by a set of 
characteristic features (and possibly some defining 
features) which are shared in varying degrees by members 
of a category; that the relationship between category 
members is found in their perceived similarity; that 
concepts represent the 'central tendency' of this 
similarity; that there are no rules for the combination 
of these features; and that the 'elemental features', 
presumed to be isomorphic with single units in the 
input system, can be independently processed. 
The shared assumption of these views is that categoriza-
tion uses stored representations that are constructed using 
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elemental features which are isomorphic with single units in 
the input system, and can be independently processed. 
The alteration of the second of these two 'prototypical' 
views in the light of the redefined feature removes this last 
characteristic, and replaces it with the assumption that 
features isomorphic with single units in the input system, 
can be integrally processed. The significance of this altera-
tion for the evolution of intelligent behaviour, and what 
precisely is meant by it, requires an examination of research 
at lower levels of perceptual processing. 
3.6 SUMMARY 
The concern of this chapter has been with models of 
human categorization. The principal characteristics of these 
models, and their adequacy in accounting for diverse empirical 
phenomena are summarised in Tables 1 and 2. 
It has been argued that the major problems of existing 
categorisation models come from the assumption that stored 
representations consist of features which are ultimately 
decomposable into elemental features (i.e. those to which 
single units in the input system are responsive), and which 
are independently processed. A redefinition of the nature of 
these features, which does not include the necessity for a 
feature to be isomorphic with a single unit, and which allows 
integral processing of features, is thus contended to resolve 
the major inadequacies of decompositonal probabilistic and 
exemplar models. The assumption that an inferential selection 
process underlies intelligent behaviour makes it clear that 
the formation of concepts requires, at least initially, the 
use of exemplars. Thus some blending of the two, not 
dissimilar, approaches would seem required. With the 
' 
modifications suggested by the assumption \of inductive 
processing and the redefinition of feature, a general 
probabilistic process of categorisation is suggested to 
underlie intelligent behaviour. The classical approach on 
the other hand, also appears to have a certain validity, 
and it is suggested that a general definitional process of 
categorisation is also present in animals capable of 
intelligent behaviour. 
It does not appear that the redefined feature is at 
all compatible with the definitional approach, but the 
different natures of the feature for the two approaches is 
not anomalous. On the contrary, it will be contended that 
it is in the changing nature.of the feature that a greater 
potential for intelligent behaviour was born. 
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Table 1: Comparison of the Principal Characteristics of 
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Table 2 : Comparison of hdw the Different Models Account 
for Various Phen'omena of Categorization 
\ 
Problems: Defnal. Probic.* Exemp. Dual Mixed 
1. 'fuzziness' of category 
boundaries no yes yes yes 
2. typicality of category 
members no yes yes yes 
3. nonnecessary components no yes yes yes 
4. similarity judgements 
for nested concepts no yes yes yes 
5. disjunctive concepts no yes yes yes 
6. failure to find defining 
features no yes yes no 
7. lack of constraints on 
component properties yes no no no 
8. correlation of component 
properties no no yes no 
9. context effects no no yes no 
10.generalization of 
component properties no no yes no 
11.conceptual combination yes no no yes 
12.use of exemplars in 
category judgements no no yes no 
13.use of frequency scores 
in category judgements no yes yes yes 
'no' means that this is a problem not accounted for in this model or 
approach. 
'yes' means that this is satisfactorily accounted for. 
















GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
Concept: In the context of this review, the term will simply 
be used to refer to a mental representation which is used 
to assign an object to a particular class of objects, and 
to infer some of the properties which might belong to an 
instance of a particular class. 
Categorization: This will be used simply in the sense of 
determining that a particular object is a member of a class 
of objects, with the implication that it is thus associated 
with the concept that relates to that class. 
(Note that the defining of 'concept' and 'categorization' 
essentially in terms of each other enables 'concepts' and 
'categories' to be used interchangeably.) 
Definitional Approach: This nomenclature refers to the 
classical approach to concepts, which assumes that all 
concepts are well-defined. It is thus in contrast to those 
views which assume that some exemplars are more representative 
or typical of the concept than others. It is synonymous with 
the term 'definitional theories', (see 'defining features', 
'probabilistic models', 'exemplar models' and 'well-defined 
categories'). 
Probabilistic Models: This term will refer to those models 
which in main essence differ from the definitional approach 
in that the summary description of any concept is not 
restricted to necessary and sufficient conditions, but 
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represents some measure of central tendency against which 
' 
instances are judged on the ~asis of similarity. These 
! 
• models are often called prototype models, but ute of the 
\ 
word 'prototype' in this context reflects a definition of 
the term which is rather too general (see Smith & Medin, 1981). 
(See 'definitional approach', 'prototype', 'featural theories', 
'dimensional theories', 'holistic theories', and 'exemplar 
models'.} 
Exemplar Models: This refers to the class of models which 
assumes no single summary representation of a concept, but 
proposes that objects are classified on the basis of comparison 
with a number of stored exemplars. This is in contrast with 
the definitional and probabilistic approaches. 
(See 'definitional approach', 'probabilistic models', and 
'exemplars'.} 
Exemplars: I note this term simply to make the point that the 
common usage of this word in the literature (as meaning one of 
the object members of a category or instance of a concept), 
should not be confused with exemplar models. 
(See 'exemplar models'.) 
Prototype: Because of the degree of variation in the use of 
this word, the term 'probabilistic' is used in this text to 
refer to a class of theories often (confusingly) called 
'prototype' theories. This usage follows Smith & Medin (1981). 
When 'prototype' is used in this text, it is taken to mean a 
summary representation reflecting some measure of central 
tendency of the instances of the concept, and including the 
\ 
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implication that some category members will consequently be 
more similar to it than others. 
(Also see 'probabilistic models' and 'prototype-distance models' 
Features: The usage of this term is one of the most confusing 
in the literature (the other is 'prototype')., Features are 
generally used interchangeably with the terms 'attributes' 
and 'properties'. Following the classical definitional 
approach to concepts, features often refer only to sensory 
or perceptual features, but the term usually includes abstract 
and functional features. More detailed discussion of what 
constitutes a feature can be found in the text, but 
(misleadingly) simple definition captures the essence of a 
feature. A feature is a component property of an object or 
concept, i.e. one that helps describe a concept but doesn't 
' 
constitute a complete description, that is in fact used in 
categorizing an object. One of the principal confusions is 
that 'feature' is used both in this general sense, and in the 
more specific sense of a qualitative component. In this 
latter case, a feature is an all-or-none affair (i.e. it 
either does or does not exist, with reference to some concept), 
and is contrasted with a 'dimension'. In this text, 'feature' 
will be restricted to its more specified meaning; in its 
general meaning the term 'component' or 'component property' 
will be used. (Note: this usage of 'feature' is specific 
to this chapter; elsewhere it will be used in its general 
sense.) 
(See also 'defining features', 'characteristic features', 
'dimensions', 'decompositional theories' and 'featural 
theories'.) 
Dimensions: A dimension is a quantitative component; in 
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contrast to a feature therefore, it expresses component 
properties in graded terms. The(word can be used in a weak 
sense which allows the possibility of discrete (as \ell as 
continuous dimensions. However, it seems more reasonable 
to insist on the property of 'betweenness', thus disallowing 
binary-valued dimensions. 
(See 'dimensional theories'.) 
Decompositional Theories: As a consequence of 'features' being 
used generally as well as specifically, the term 'decomposi-
tional theories', while clearly referring to the basic 
distinction with holistic theories, is often used inter-
changeably with 'featural' theories. It does however, refer 
to the approach which assumes that concepts can be broken 
down into component properties. It thus subsumes definitional 
models, most probabilistic models, and most exemplar models. 
'Component' theories, also used in the literature, refers to 
the same thing. 
(See 'definitional approach', 'probabilistic models', 
'featural theories', and 'exemplar models'.) 
Holistic Theories: In the text this is used for a particular 
subset of probabilistic models. However, this is only because 
the minimal work on holistic theories of categorization has 
been done in the context of a probabilistic approach. The 
distinction in point of fact, is one of holistic theories 
versus decompositional or component theories, and the essence 
of the distinction is that the former assume a one-to-one 
relationship between the mental representation of a concept 
and the real-world object that is an instance of that concept 
(the representation to be unanalyzable). 
(See 'probabilistic models', and 'decompositional theories'.) 
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Defining Features: This term is usually associated with the 
c\assical definitional approach, and in that context refers 
to component properties that are singly necessary and jointly 
sufficient for category membership. The term is also used to 
refer to any component properties that are necessary for 
category membership, thus allowing the notion of necessary 
components to be included in probabilistic models. The term 
will be used in the latter, looser sense in this text. 
{Also see 'definitional approach', 'characteristic features', 
and 'well-defined categories'.} 
Characteristic Features: This term refers to component 
properties that, while not necessarily associated with each 
member of a category, have a reasonable probability of so being, 
and are accordingly used in making category decisions. 
(Also see'probabilistic models' and 'ill-defined categories'.) 
Featural Theories: As discussed, this is sometimes equated 
with decompositional theories. However, it is used here to 
refer to a subset of probabilistic models which are 
characterised by the use of features (as opposed to dimensions) 
as the component properties of each concept. In this sense, 
it can be thought of as one of two subsets of decompositional 
probabilistic models. 
(See 'probabilistic models', 'features', and 'decompositional 
theories' . ) 
Dimensional Theories: This of course refers to the other 
subset of decompositional probabilistic models. 
(See 'probabilistic models', 'decompositional theories', 
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'dimensions', and 'featural theorie$'.) 
Feature-list Theories: This is a term which is sometiies 
used in a contrast with 'prototype' theories. In this 
context the class of models referred to is also sometimes 
called 'feature theories', and one should beware the ready 
confusion with featural theories and decompositional theories. 
What is meant is that group of theories which assume that a 
concept takes the form of a list of component properties. 
This is compatible with the definitional approach, and also 
with a subset of probabilistic models termed 'frequency 
models'. 
(See 'definitional approach', 'prototype', 'features', 
'decompositional theories', 'featural theories', 'frequency 
models' and 'prototype-distance models'.) 
Well-defined Categories: This refers to those categories 
of objects for which the concept can be represented as a set 
of singly necessary and jointly sufficient component 
properties. While it is usually associated with the defini-
tional approach, many probabilistic models make allowance 
for their existence. 
(Also see 'definitional approach', 'defining features', and 
'ill-defined categories'.) 
Ill-defined Categories: This term refers to those categories 
for which there is no simple set of criterial components. 
The notion is not therefore allowable in the definitional 
approach, but it is generally assumed in alternative models 
that most natural concepts are of this nature. 
(Also see 'definitional approach', 'probabilistic models', 
'characteristic features', and 'well-defined categories'.) 
\ 
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Frequency Models: These models are a subset of featural 
theories, and are characterized by the assumption that people 
compile the frequency with which features occur among instances 
of a concept, and use this information in assigning objects 
to a category. They are also sometimes called 'feature 
frequency models'. Frequency models are usually compared 
with 'prototype-distance' models. 
(See 'probabilistic models', 'featural theories', 'feature-
list theories', 'characteristic features', 'prototype-
distance models' and 'cue validity models'.) 
Prototype-distance Models: This refers to a subset of 
probabilistic dimensional models, in which category decisions 
are made on the basis of distance from a prototype. This 
type of model is also sometimes referred to simply as a 
prototype model. 
(See 'probabilistic models', 'dimensional theories', 
'feature-list theories', 'frequency models', and 'average-
distance models'.) 
Average-distance Models: This refers to those models in 
which category decisions are based on finding the smallest 
average distance between object-to-be-categorized and stored 
pattern, where the stored pattern might refer to exemplars 
or prototypes or some other form of summary representation, 
and distance reflects similarity. Thus, average-distance 
models are a subset within the classes of exemplar models 
and probabilistic dimensional models. 
(Also see 'probabilistic models', 'exemplar models', 
'dimensional theories', and 'prototype-distance models'.) 
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Cue Validity Models: This refers to those probabilistic 
dimensional theories which include the assumption that people 
learn the degree to which values on individual dimensions can 
be used to predict category membership, and that category 
decisions are based on summing the cue validities of each 
component property. These models are also sometimes known 
as 'probability models' (not to be confused with probabilistic 
models). 
(See 'probabilistic models' and 'dimensional theories'.) 
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Note: the terminology used for the types of theory within the 
exemplar approach emphasises that the methods used to 
assess similarity in probabilistic models are extendable 
to exemplar models, but of course there are important 
differences in the exemplar models notwithstanding the 
similar assessment methods. 
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CHAPTER 4 
PERCEPTUAL PROCESSING IN HUMANS 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The essence of 'features' of a concept, is that they 
are those holistic percepts which define or characterize a 
concept. In the classical, definitional approach, concepts 
are assumed to form a hierarchy, such that their description 
ultimately resides in 'primitive' features, which are 
isomorphic with single units in the input system. It is the 
objective of this chapter, to examine the question of whether 
this assumption is supported by research into lower levels 
of processing, or whether, as suggested in the previous 
chapter, features can be configurations of elements, 
processed integrally, and not necessarily isomorphic with 
single units. 
Information-processing systems in biological organisms 
may be investigated at three different levels (following 
Dodwell, 1978): 
1. As the detector of signals in a normally "noisy" ambient 
stimulus environment. 
2. As the organizer or integrator of sensory data. 
3. As the user of perceptual information for cognitive 
ends. 
The last of these was examined in the previous chapter. 
In this chapter the first two levels of processing - what may 
be termed 'signal detection' and 'pattern recognition' are 
examined. 
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4.2 THE PROCESSING OF SENSORY STIMULI 
4.2.1 Modes of Perceptual Processing 
The first level of perceptual processing, 'signal 
detection', is the processing of stimuli which vary along 
sensory dimensions. Sensory stimuli, by definition, have 
properties which are detectable by sensory receptors. While 
they can be no more than a change on a single dimension 
(e.g. wav~length}, the class subsumes all those stimuli 
composed of changes on sensory dimensions. 
Even at this simple level, analysis appears to be 
complicated by several factors. For a start, it has been 
assumed that stimulus generalization is a function of the 
closeness of stimuli on an objectively measurable, physical 
dimenpion. To some extent this is indeed the case, but it 
is not completely so. For example, people generalize more 
to tones an octave away rather than to tones physically 
nearer on the dimension of pitch (Herrnstein, 1982). Part 
of the reason for this is that pitch perception is not one-
dimensional. The interdependence of some physical dimensions 
in this way clearly strains the simplistic, reductionist 
approach. Physica~ dimensions which, when associated in the 
description of some stimulus, are not separate or independent, 
are known as integral dimensions. In such a relationship are 
the dimensions of saturation and brightness. Other dimensions, 
known as separable dimensions, are independent in effect. 
Thus, if a stimulus is being described in terms of size and 
brightness, these dimensions are completely independent of 
each other. 
Following this distinction of integral and separable 
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dimensions, it has become apparent that there ar~ two modes of 
perceptual processing: the processing of stimuli in a unitary, 
holistic manner, and the processing of stimuli by reference to 
their constituent dimensional components. These are character-
istically related to perceptual dimensions such that holistic 
processing is associated with integral dimensions and analytic 
processing with separable dimensions. 
· However, if the mode of processing was totally under 
the control of the stimulus dimensions, then this concept of 
processing mode would hardly be a useful one. Growing 
evidence points to a number of stimulus, processor and task· 
variables being involved in determining mode of processing. 
For example, it appears that young children (and older retarded 
children) tend to process holistically stimuli that are 
analysed by adults, and it has been suggested that individual 
differences exist among adults. It also seems that processing 
mode varies according to the nature and conditions of the 
task (see Foard & Nelson, 1984, for a brief review of this 
evidence). 
It is worthy of note - for future reference - that two 
of the task factors that are significant are (a) the amount of 
time and/or resources allowed; and (b) whether the task calls 
for learning a rule by which to classify, or not. Holistic 
processing is more likely when time and/or resources is 
limited, and analytic processing is more likely when rule-
learning is required. 
The situation is also complicated by evidence that 
generalization along a physical dimension may be abrupt. 
Rosch for example, has offered extensive evidence (Rosch, 
1977) that colour has 8 to 12 "salient points" which form the 
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basis of human colour categories. Pigeons too, demonstrate 
sharp (but slightly different) transitions from one basic 
colour category ~o another (Blough, 1961). Again, there are 
clear, apparently innate, transitions in the perception of 
speech. For example, people hear a sudden transition between 
the sounds of /d/ and /t/ at a voice onset time (the time 
difference between the onset of the plosive burst and the onset 
of voice} of approximately 35 rn/sec.(see Herrnstein, 1982). 
Curiously enough, similar results have been achieved with 
chinchillas (Kuhl & Miller, 1975). 
4.2.2 Implications 
The implications of this information can hardly be 
appreciated without an understanding of the traditional 
assumptions of categorisation (discussed in 3.3.1). Very 
briefly, we can say that categorisation (which may in this 
context be defined, without processing assumptions, as "the 
division of the world into classifications by which non-
identical stimuli can be treated as equivalent" (Rosch, 1978) 
was traditionally assumed to be characterized by the following 
properties: 
(i) arbitrariness of category formation; 
(ii} equivalence of category members (i.e. each exemplar of 
a category is equally representative of that category); 
(iii) determinacy of category boundaries (i.e. the distinction 
between one category and any other is clear-cut); and 
(ivL decomposability of categories (i.e. membership in a 
category is on the basis of constituent component 
properties). 
From these four basic properties, two more points may be 
made. Firstly, the assumption of arbitrariness sterns from the 
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belief in association as the fundamental principle jof human 
behaviour (from British empirical philosophy of the seventeenth 
century) - that is, a newborn human has a blank mind, and 
connections between stimuli are formed entirely arbitrarily 
by association. Secondly, the assumption that categories 
form a hierarchy, ultimately definable in terms of elemental 
features, carried with it the implicit assumption that the 
processing of those features is independent. 
The evidence for innate transitions in sensory perception 
challenges the assumption of arbitrariness. The existence of 
holistic processing suggests that stimuli made up of more than 
one stimulus dimension are not necessarily analyzable by 
breaking them down into component dimensions - if the elements 
are interdependent, such analysis may lose significant informa-
tion. Consequently, the analytic processing of integral 
stimuli is more likely to result in incorrect information. 
It is clear that the importance of this, as well as the 
probability and nature of error, will be partly determined 
by the nature and conditions of the task. 
It is not of course assumed that the processing of 
simple sensory stimuli necessarily tells us anything about 
the processing of other, more complex stimuli. However, it 
seems evident that the traditional assumption that patterns 
and concepts could be broken down into component parts, such 
that their definition would ultimately reside in those 
components, was based on an understanding of these simple 
stimuli - a set of stimuli which seemed to be clearly decom-
posable into defining values on sensory dimensions. 
The extrapolation of those assumptions being made about 
the processing of simple sensory stimuli to stimuli which were 
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npt definable in terms of the same type of physical dimensions, 
led to the idea tha\ there were sensory detectors for 
geometrical features. From this develops the traditional, 
analytic approach to pattern recognition. 
4.3 THEORIES OF PATTERN RECOGNITION 
The second level of perceptual processing involves the 
organization or integration of sensory data - a process 
considered to be largely automatic. The area of research 
which deals with this level is commonly entitled 'pattern 
recognition', and in human studies tends to concern visual 
pattern, described as "a collection of contours or edges, 
which in turn are defined as regions of sharp change in the 
level of a physical property of light (usually intensity) 
impinging on the retina" (Dodwell, 1970). More generally, 
'pattern' tends to be used to refer to a perceptual stimulus 
which may be seen to be composed of a number of different 
stimuli. In terms of 'pattern recognition' research, these 
perceptual stimuli are usually required to have a certain 
simplicity. 
4.3.l The Analytic Approach 
According to this approach, the initial stages of 
processing are analytic, that is, the pattern is broken down 
into elementary components (the nature of which varies 
according to the specific model). Later, a complementary 
process puts the outputs of the feature analyzers together 
and creates an internal representation of the pattern. 
Consideration of the later, synthetic operation has tended 
to be neglected. In some models for example, the features once 
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detected are listed, and the feature list compared wit~ 
feature lists for known patterns. By keeping the pattern 
as a list of features throughout the processing stages, the 
pattern is in fact never reconstructed. This approach is 
typical of computerized pattern recognition. 
The analytic approach to biological systems has 
received a large part of its support from the neurophysio-
logical studies of Hubel & Wiesel (1962, 1965). To very 
briefly summarise the main points of importance, it appears 
that in the mammalian visual system (Hubel & Wiesel's work 
was in fact on cats; the generality of the results is commonly 
assumed), three main types of neuron can be found. These 
are called 'simple', 1 complex', and 'hypercomplex' cells on 
the basis of their response characteristics. 'Simple' 
neuronal units for example, respond to orientation and length 
of light-dark borders, while complex and hypercomplex cells 
respond progressively to more general characteristics. 
These different types of neuron are grouped so that most 
simple cells are in layer IV of area 17 of the striate 
cortex, complex cells in the remaining layers of area 17 and 
area 18, and hypercomplex cells in area 19. They thus can 
be considered as marking serial steps in the passage of 
visual information from the retina to the association cortex. 
In keeping with the classical processing assumption, Hubel & 
Wiesel suggested that specific patterns of convergence of 
the outputs of one type of cell lead to the construction of a 
higher-order type of receptive field - for example, the 
appropriate convergence of specific simple-cell outputs 
creates complex receptive fields. 
They further suggested that these three neuronal 
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class~s formed the lower levels of an hierarchical system 
concerned with the abst\action of salient information (such 
as edges and angles) from visual stimuli. Implicit in this, 
is the idea that single cells at the top of the hierarchy 
might represent complete percepts (John & Schwartz, 1978). 
Challenges to the Analytic Approach 
Although the type of serial processing strategy in 
which a pattern remains little more than a collection of 
features throughout the processing stages, is emphasised in 
most pattern recognition theories, it seems most unlikely 
that this type of system would be applicable to biological 
visual systems "which are often able to recognise patterns on 
a level that transcends the identity of their constituent 
features" (Hughes, 1982). 
The evidence against a purely analytic approach begins 
with the undeniable evidence that perceptual data are 
organized and integrated in accordance with a number of 
principles, which are presumably innate. Many of these 
principles have been codified and are known as the "Gestalt" 
principles of organization. Examples are such 'laws' as those 
of proximity (elements close together in space tend to be 
grouped together), and similarity (objects that look alike 
tend to be grouped together). Implicit in these principles 
is the interdependence of elements in a pattern - the 
impossibility of decomposing a pattern (and any object may be 
thought of as a pattern) into a number of independently 
processed components. Moreover, echoing the evidence that 
holistic processing is used when time is limited, evidence 
suggests that humans perceive certain larger configurations 
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faster and more accurately than their components (see, 
e.g. Pomerantz, Soyer & Stoeven, 1977). 
Further challenges to a pure feature-detector approach, 
and support for the importance of the configuration of 
elements come from neurophysiological research. First of 
all, the idea that there are specialized neurons which divide 
the visual world into a limited set of perceptual categories 
by the one-to-one correspondence of category and specialized 
"feature extractor'', requires that the responsivity of a 
single cell be uniquely specifiable. But the evidence is 
clear, that multivariate stimulus features contribute to the 
firing rate of a single cortical cell (John & Schwartz, 1978). 
There is a growing body of evidence which suggests that 
in fact spatiotemporal patterns of neural activity are the 
basis for information processing. Some of this evidence is 
very briefly noted here (from John & Schwartz, 1978): 
(i1 evidence that information and function are distributed 
across extensive anatomical domains and that the brain 
is capable of reorganising information processing follow-
ing injury to areas of the brain (see, e.g. Dru, Walker 
& Walker, l975 re rats; Sprague, 1966 re cats; 
Griffith & Davidson, 1966 re humans); 
(iil evidence that most neurons in the brain are continuously 
active and each may be shown (if observed long enough) 
to significantly alter its firing pattern consequent 
upon the presentation of any stimulus (Burns & Smith, 
l962, cats); 
(iii) evidence that the relationship between neuron firing 
patterns and event-related potentials (waveshapes which 
reflect the processing of stimuli, in particular, 
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c9mponents of ERPs appear to reflect parameters of the 
physical stimulus) \ not invariant; that is,neurons 
which demonstrated one relationship to the waveshape 
could be observed to change to another relationship 
sometime later (Ramos, Schwartz & John, 1976, using 
cats); and 
(iv) evidence that the activation of some neurons in different 
regions of the cortex is triggered when subjective 
images of whole objects are retrieved from memory, that 
is, by the image of a concrete goal (see Shvyrkov, 
1981) . 
In summary, it appears that some neurophysiological 
evidence supports the view that processing of even simple 
well-defined stimuli, is a function of neural circuits rather 
than single neurons. It is interesting to note in this 
context, that recent physiological evidence supports a view 
of memory as dependent on changes in connectivity between 
elements of interconnected groups. In particular, there is 
clear evidence that precisely specified changes in synaptic 
connectivity store memory in invertebrates (see Faley & 
Alkon, 1985, for a review of this evidence) To quote 
Kruglikov (1978): "The material substrate of memory is a system 
of elements; the functional role and real contribution of 
each element to the function of memory are realized only when 
this element is incorporated into a system, hence are never 
independent of such a system". This is congruent with the 
growing evidence that spatiotemporal and configurational 
characteristics of neuronal activity are more important in 
the processing of data than the activity of single neurons. 
There is also more specific neurophysiological evidence 
against the pure analytic approach, as expressed in the 
transcortical model of Hubel & Wiesel. The most direct 
comes from a number of behavioural demonstrations of 
substantial capacities for complex spatial vision in 
destriate animals (see for example, Humphrey, 1974; 
Keating, l975; Hughes, 1977; Sprague et al, 1977; 
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Dineen & Keating, 1979). Moreover, while there is no doubt 
that damage to area l7 has severe consequences for visual 
perception, removal of areas 17 and 18 has virtually no 
effect on learned discriminations of simple patterns or 
forms in the cat (Sprague et al. 1977; Bertucchi & Sprague, 
1980). On the other hand, cats with large extrastriate 
lesions have impaired pattern and form discrimination (ibid). 
Recent studies by Sprague & Hughes (Hughes, 1982) provide 
evidence for the importance of global structural cues in 
pattern perception. It appears that local feature analysis 
occurs in the striate cortex, but global configurational 
processing occurs in the extrastriate cortex. Which strategy 
is employed may well depend on certain aspects of the input 
pattern. This suggestion implies that the perception of 
stimulus configuration precedes detailed feature analysis. 
In contrast, most serial-processing approaches assume that 
configurational analysis depends on feature analysis. 
The idea that configurational perception precedes 
feature analysis, is also supported by the evidence that the 
nature of a visual scene determines to a large extent the 
scan path used to study it (Neisser, 1967). It is clear 
that this requires a mechanism that doesn't rely on focal 
attention, but can analyze the visual field in sufficient 
detail to extract enough information to decide what in the 
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visual field should be focussed on. Neisser called this 
process ~preattentive vision', and it seems clear that such 
a process precedes the formation of a figure-ground perception, 
and is based on gestalt factors of perceptual organization 
(Hughes, 1982). 
It is worth noting therefore, that work in the field 
of artificial intelligence suggests that gestalt-type grouping 
actually results in the formation of a figure-ground 
distinction (Marr, 1976). Moreover, it seems that feature 
analysis is often inadequate to distinguish form boundaries 
unless a gestalt-like grouping process has been carried out 
(ibidl. It seems that the grouping process reduces the amount 
of information by organizing the data base in ways that aid 
in subsequent object recognition. 
It is clear that the analytic approach fails to take 
into consideration this relational aspect of pattern recogni-
tion. Of those who have examined the way in which integration 
occurs, the most prominent approaches have been the motor 
integration theories, figural synthesis models, and field 
theories (Dodwell, 1982). 
4.3.2 Motor Integration Theories 
Motor integration theories (as propounded most 
prominently by Hebb, 1949; and Hochberg, 1968), propose that 
'integrated wholes' are constructed from certain primitive 
elements by the sequencing of eye movements and neuronal 
structures which are organized thereby. For example, Hebb 
hypothesised that neurons were interconnected in sets, such 
that the firing of one neuron affected the probability of the 
firing of others in the set. Spatio-temporal contiguity of 
firing within the set (determined by builtfin eye movement 
processes) changes these probabilities, leading to the 
development of an organized perceptual field. Thus the 
integration of visual data is a function of the repetitive 
sequential fixations of visual receptors, which sequence 
is partly influenced by experience. 
Probably the major weakness of this type of theory 
67 
is its failure to adequately explain (a) how different 
classes of input give rise to identifiably different outputs, 
and members of particular classes of input give rise to the 
same output; and (b} how input classes are initially 
generated (i.e. the first stages of perceptual learning}. 
4.3.3 Figural Synthesis Models 
Of major importance in the popularity of a feature-
detector approach, was the research done by Hubel & Wiesel 
(1962; 1968), pin-pointing cortical detectors for orientation 
in cats. Although this approach has had some success, its 
promise has not been fulfilled. One reason for that is the 
neurophysiological evidence that spatial frequency, orienta-
tion and movement are the primary parameters of coding, 
rather than the line segment system advocated by Hubel & 
Wiesel (see Campbell 1974 and Robson, 1975 for a review of 
this evidence}. Consequently, spatial frequency models 
(~ubsumed under models of figural synthesis} rose in 
popularity. 
These models postulate a frequency-analysis mechanism 
of some sort. One hypothesis, for example, is that a Fourier 
analysis is performed by the visual nervous system on the 
coded inputs (individual cells coded for spatial frequency 
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in a specific orientation), and the frequency components are 
then synthe\ised into a new and abstract representation of 
the input pattern (Campbell & Robson, 1968). 
However, it seems unlikely that such a model, involving 
any type of frequency analysis, could operate at any sophisti-
cated or global level (see Sekular, 1974; Robson, 1975; 
Glezer et al. 1973). 
4.3.4 Field Theories 
(a) Geometrical Models of Vision 
Gestalt theory is of course the most prominent of the 
field theories, but the success of this approach has proved 
to be limited to the formulation of a set of organizational 
principles. For a deeper analysis, beyond the level of mere 
description, geometrical concepts have proved to be useful 
tools, and a number of geometrical models of vision have been 
proposed. Examples include: 
(11 Luneburg's (1947) Theory of Binocular Visual Space 
Without getting into the geometrical details of this 
model, and at the risk of over-simplifying, one can say that 
the essentials of Luneburg's theory are that there is a 
consistent one-to-one mapping of the points in a visual field 
onto points on the retina ('binocular space') which is defined 
by two basic measures: 
(il convergence of the eyes; and 
(ii) their elevation from the horizontal plane of regard. 
Although the points in the visual field are points in 
a three-dimensional physical space that is Euclidean, it 
follows from the requirements of Luneburg's model that the 
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binocular visual space be non-Euclidean and in\fact hyperbolic. 
Thus the 'rules' which are true in physical space are not, by 
and large, true in binocular space (e.g. in Euclidean space 
two distances that are equal to a third distance are 
necessarily equal to each other, but this is not true in 
hyperbolic space), and consequently distances between points 
in binocular space cannot be measured in the same way we 
measure distance in physical space. 
Experiments undertaken to test this model (see, e.g. 
Zajaczkowska, 1956; and Blank, 1958) have clearly demonstrated 
that the.space of binocular judgements is not a simple 
Euclidean space. This evidence however, is restricted to 
highly artificial situations, and the validity of the model 
outside a static situation is doubtful. Nevertheless, this 
in itself is important, for its implication that the normal 
space of visual judgements appears Euclidean partly because 
of cognitive judgement regarding the nature of physical objects 
and events. That is, the limited validity of this model 
clearly demonstrates the influence of higher level processing 
on lower level processing. 
(2) Watson's (1978) Variable Space Theory 
There are a number of visual illusions that demonstrate 
a lack of congruence between what is seen and what is known 
about the physical measurements of the object. While numerous 
theories to account for these phenomena have been proposed, 
none have succeeded in accounting for more than one illusion 
and its variants. Typical of these theories is the assumption 
that visual space has a fixed geometry, and that the illusions 
are aberrations. Watson (1978) has hypothesised that the 
I 
\ 
geometry of visual space is variable, and depends in a 
precise way on ~he configuration of elements in different 
I 
parts of the visual field, which interact as functions 
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primarily of local contrast and separation between elements. 
Thus, illusions are seen to be, not aberrations, but natural 
consequences of the processing mechanism. 
As with the Luneburg theory, the applications of this 
model are limited. Again, it has only been worked out for 
static configurations, and again, the geometry is probably 
usually overridden by other aspects of visual processing. 
However, its success in accounting for diverse phenomena of 
visual illusions supports the basic thesis of geometrical 
models. 
(3) Lie Transformation Group Theory 
Hoffman (1966, 1971, 1977) has attempted to answer the 
question of "(how} the local, microscopic processes in the 
visual field generate macroscopic events that yield the 
perception of contours, objects, and visual space generally" 
(Dodwell, 1982}, by applying the mathematics of continuous 
transformation groups (worked out by Sophus Lie in the 
nineteenth century) to visual processing. 
The mathematics is somewhat complex, but the essence of 
this theory can be articulated fairly briefly, if over-
simplistically. 
A transformation is an operation that maps a geometrical 
object onto some other object. Such operations can be 
represented by vectors, which have both origin and direction. 
A vector expresses a purely local property, but a field of 
vectors, by the way in which the vectors can be combined, can 
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express macroscopic or global properties. A field/of vectors 
can be thought of as potentially generating all the paths 
across the manifold (i.e. a smooth surface on which continuous 
transformations can occur; here identified with both the 
visual field and its cortical representation), and it may well 
be that the structure of the manifold determines which paths 
are most easily generated upon it. 
Hoffman observed that many visual phenomena occur in 
such a way that pairs of processes are orthogonal to each 
other, for example, the orthogonal or (Lie orbit) pair for 
horizontal and vertical translations, and the pair for dilation 
and rotation (consisting of a star of radial lines and a set 
of concentric circles). The generator of a tranilation is 
called a Lie operator, and Lie operators will, under a specific 
set of simple restrictions, form a closed system called a Lie 
algebra. Thus, under these restrictions, the Lie operators 
possibly are limited both in number and complexity. 
The general posulate of the theory is that the visual 
system seeks out those Lie operators which will reduce the 
output for any path to zero. The simpler the operators, 
the easier discriminations involving them will be. 
This of course, points to an easy test of the theory, 
in that it makes explicit predictions concerning what sort 
of discriminations will be easy. Although there have been 
few explicit tests ·of the theory as yet, some fairly strong 
empirical support has been received (see, e.g. Caelli, 1974, 
1977; Wilkinson & Dodwell, 1980). 
One in particular is the experimental study undertaken 
by Wilkinson & Dodwell. In this, the prediction of the 
theory, that radial line/concentric circle discriminations will 
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~e easy, was tested using young kittens. Surprisingly, but 
in accordance with \he theory, it was found that the discrimina-
tion was even easier than the traditionally simple discrimina-
tion of horizontal vs vertical translations (note: this result 
is the opposite to what would be predicted by a simple feature-
detector model, or spatial-frequency theory). Moreover, sets 
0 of rectangular hyperbolas at 45 angles from each other, are 
also relatively easy for young kittens to discriminate. - this 
pattern is the third fundamental Lie orbit pair. 
(bl Implications 
The present degree of understanding is not such that we 
should choose one model and discard the others. Indeed, 
Dodwell (l978, 1982) suggests that the complexity of the visual 
system is such that it is unlikely that any single model will 
be adequate to explain it. It should not be assumed then, that 
any of the models put forward here are necessarily incompatible 
with any others. Nor should the limited power of some models 
to explain a wide variety of visual phenomena, be taken as 
justification for disregarding their possible contribution to 
our understanding of visual processes. Luneburg's model, for 
example, makes a major contribution in its conceptualisation 
of the conditions under which mapping from the physical world 
to the visual system can be achieved. The success of Watson's 
application of Riemannian geometry in explaining visual 
illusions gives credence to the basic concept of geometrical 
models. 
The success of these models (especially the most 
general of them - Lie Transformation Group theory) in explain-
ing diverse phenomena of pattern recognition, suggests that 
the approach may well be the most nearly accurate one\yet 
postulated. In particular, the fundamental principle of 
'mental space' having a geometry and structure of its own, 
which governs the representation of objects, appears to be 
strongly supported. 
In summary, we may say that 
Ci) a pure feature-detector approach makes no allowance 
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for the importance of relational aspects of stimuli; 
(iil the importance of relational aspects is suggested by 
the so-called Gestalt principles; and 
(iii} neurophysiological evidence provides extensive support 
for the idea that spatiotemporal patterns of neural 
activity are the basis for information processing, 
and for the existence of a mode of visual processing 
which is concerned with global configurations. 
The success of geometrical field theories indicates: 
(ivl a lack of congruence between objects in physical 
space and images in visual space; and 
(v) that visual space has a geometry and structure of its 
own, which governs the representation of objects. 
Moreover, the nature of this geometry allows a 
distinction between 'pattern' and 'feature' (easily perceived 
as arbitrary in many situations) to be made - that is, if 
'feature' is defined as the constituent components of a 
decomposable stimulus/pattern, then these approaches can be 
seen to allow a redefinition of feature as a unitary, holistic 
percept (i.e. not further decomposable) - thus making the 
point that a feature may be a configuration of elements, which 
is not decomposable because the configuration is as important 




This chapter hak been concerned with the first two levels 
of perceptual processing. Research at the first level - that 
of the detection of. sensory stimuli - has uncovered evidence 
that challenges a view of stimuli as being generally decompos-
able into component dimensions which may be independently 
processed. Instead, it seems likely that such analytic 
processing may, in certain circumstances, result in the 
loss of significant information, and that the importance of 
this loss is partly determined by the nature and conditions 
of the task being carried out by the processor (i.e. by the 
processor's goals). 
'Pattern recognition research is supposedly concerned 
with the organisation and integration of these elemental 
stimuli. However, the distinction between 'patterns' and 
many of the 'elemental' stimuli often may seem somewhat 
arbitrary. Thus, for example, stimuli which are presumably 
simple patterns, such as line segments, are grouped with the 
more directly sensory stimuli, and assumed to be likewise 
perceived by unit detectors (though of the cortex rather than 
by peripheral sensory receptors). 
One perspective which resolves the arbitrary nature of 
the distinction, is the view that theories of pattern recogni-
tion are implicitly theories of the nature of the 'feature' 
(i.e. element). Thus the evidence for Gestalt laws, with 
their message that some patterns convey more information than 
can be conveyed by the independent processing of their 
constituent parts; the successes of theories which postulate 
internal representations of a more holographic nature; and 
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the neurophysiological evidence for processing being a ~unction 
of neural circuits rather than single neurons, and memory a 
function of changes in synaptic connectivity; are all inter-
pretable as justification for a definition 0£ 'feature' as a 
unitary, holistic percept - i.e. a stimulus which cannot be 
further decomposed, without loss of significant information, 
within the processing system. The important distinction of 
this definition from the standard definition of feature in 
categorization research, lies in those words ''without loss 





DISCRIMINATION IN NON-HUMAN ANIMALS 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The classical empiricist tradition assumed that sensory 
features provided the primitive elements which defined a 
category, and members of categories were identified on the 
basis of this set of defining features and rules defining 
their relationship. This was assumed to be a general principle, 
applicable to such diverse classes of object as that of simple 
geometric forms (such as a square), and that of superordinate 
lexical categories Csuch as fruit). These, it was considered, 
varied only in complexity. This of course, made it possible 
to significantly simplify experimental research into categoriza-
tion by restricting the test stimuli to well-defined objects, 
such as simple perceptual forms. 
Despite this view, which sees human concepts as composed 
of defining features and rules, it has been common to assume 
that the evidence that animals recognize objects on the basis 
of a few criterial properties, means that they are 'discrimina-
ting' rather than 'conceptualising' or 'abstracting' (as humans 
are said to do). What is the assumed or perceived difference 
between human and non-human object classification that leads 
to this difference in terminology? 
What does it mean to 'abstract'? The term refers to 
a process of taking something out; the implication is that 
humans categorise objects by picking out specific features or 
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attributes. To 'discriminate' on the other hand, simply me~ns 
to act on the basis of there being a difference between two 
or more objects. It is clear that the word involves no 
assumptions about what is involved at a cognitive level. To 
'abstract' on the other hand, suggests an active process. 
It seems fair to suggest that the distinction was by 
no means clear to early theorists in the field. Initially, 
research focussed on the passive and gradual learning of the 
defining features. It was not until the mid-1950s, that the 
emphasis shifted to the subjects' active hypothesis testing 
in the learning of relevant features and the logical rules 
combining them (Mervis & Rosch, 1981). 
The possibly active nature of the selection process in 
non-human animals has been far less considered. Nevertheless, 
the entire structure of the early behavioural experiments 
in the laboratory assumed that animals could learn what infor-
mation was significant in particular situations. And indeed, 
in Sutherland's (1968) theory of pattern recognition, we see 
acknowledgement of the possibility that some non-human 
species form rules for the combination of features, and that 
such a process is "akin to induction'' (Sutherland, 1969). 
The other traditional approach to stimulus classifica-
tion was that of the ethologists, who found an analogously 
simple set of stimuli in the natural environment, namely, the 
so-called 'releasing stimuli'·which provide the initial 
triggers for fixed action patterns. These are stereotyped, 
species-typical behaviours, which are apparently innate, and 
require no learning. The applicability of the results of 
this work to questions of the flexibility of stimulus 
classification in non-humans, is doubtful. 
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Th~ concern of this chapter is precisely that - the 
flexibility of stimulus classification in non-human species. 
It is the contention of the lriter that, for reasons relating 
to the way in which these cognitive processes evolved, both 
the 'definitional' and the 'probabilistic' cognitive 
processes will be utilized by some animals (including humans) 
In others, only the 'definitional' process will be used; 
while in still others, the processing of information is of 
a passive nature which doesn't warrant the title 'cognitive 
process', but may be regarded as pre-definitional. 
To provide support for this thesis, we will look at 
neurophysiological and behavioural evidence for the existence 
of two different modes of perceptual processing (level 2), 
which imply two different types of feature. We will then 
look at a few examples of diverse behaviours within two 
functional classes of natural behaviour - prey recognition 
and call recognition - and demonstrate the range of informa-
tion processing systems involved. Namely, from a passive 
feature-extractor process to two distinct cognitive processes, 
which may be interpretable as 'definitional' and 'probabilistic'. 
The results of the artificial test situations used to investi-
gate discrimination in the laboratory will then be discussed, 
for the evidence that they provide that different cognitive 
processes are demonstrated in different situations. 
5.2 MODES OF PERCEPTUAL PROCESSING 
In Chapter 3 we concluded that it was the changing 
nature of the feature which underlies a discontinuity in the 
evolution of intelligent behaviour. The nature of the feature 
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in human processing systems has been suggested as being an 
holistic percept, which may be configurational, not isomorphic 
with single units in the processing system, and integrally 
processed. This view of the feature is in direct opposition 
to the idea of the feature which is implicit in the traditional 
view of the information-processing system - namely, that 
processing is serial and begins with the analysis of features 
which are independently processed and isomorphic with single 
neuronal units. At the second level, the level at which the 
nature of the feature is most clearly displayed, these opposing 
views may be thought of as the "Gestalt perception'process" 
and the "stimulus summation process" respectively. 
The hypothesised change in the nature of the feature 
from that implicit in the Gestalt perception process, is 
supported by neuroethological evidence. Before looking at 
the processing systems evidenced by diverse examples of 
perceptual coding mechanisms, it should be noted that it is 
not the author's contention that a Gestalt process replaced 
a summation process. Rather, it is considered that the 
evolution of a summation process preceded that of a Gestalt 
process, and that it was the evolution of a Gestalt process 
(co-existing with a summation process) that gave rise to the 
'probabilistic' cognitive process. 
A few examples of perceptual discrimination exhibited 
by different non-human species (from Hailman, 1970) provide 
support for this thesis. 
The first is that of the frog's colour dis.crimination. 
The escape response of frogs when frightened is to leap into 
the water. This response appears to be partly directed by 
the water's blue colour, and is evidently a true colour 
discriminatiotj rather than merely a spectral sensitivity. 
Muntz (1962) has demonstrated thrt the discrimination of 
\ 
'blue' is stable over a great range of intensities and 
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spectral bandwidth. That the discrimination is not due to a 
single type of receptor is indicated by the evidence that 
green light inhibits the response to blue. This response to 
blue light is however, only evident in adults. Tadpoles 
respond to green light - a response which appears to be 
mediated by a single visual pigment contained in the cones 
(Muntz, 1963). This difference in response is probably a 
function of the early development of cones in the retina, 
and the later development of rods. 
It appears that here we have an example of a perceptual 
discrimination which: 
(i) is coded within the eye by third-order neurons; 
(ii) develops because of maturation of the sensory 
apparatus; and 
(iii) results from a passive process involving the combina-
tion of separable, primitive features (i.e. those 
isomorphic with single neuronal units). 
A similar example can be found in the preferences of 
laughing gull chicks for red and blue wavelengths over green 
and yellow wavelengths. This preference relates to their 
pecking response to the red beak of their parents. As in the 
frog, the discrimination appears to be largely independent of 
wavelength purity (Hailman, 1964; 1967}, and .the inhibitory 
effect of the middle wavelengths suggests that at least two 
receptor types are involved. It appears that, in the laughing 
gull chick's colour preference, we have another example of a 
perceptual discrimination coded within the eye, probably by 
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second-order neurons, and interpretable as resulting from 
a passive process involving the combination of separable, 
primitive features. In contrast however, this discrimination 
is evident at birth. 
On the other hand, the pecking response of a laughing 
gull chick is mediated by more than a colour preference. Also 
involved are a number of characteristics which relate to a 
form-movement discrimination: oblong shape, about 9 mm in 
width, vertically oriented, moving horizontally at a specific 
speed, being darker than its background, and being visible 
at eye level by both eyes. Most of these parameters could 
be coded by the type of neuronal unit commonly referred to 
as 'feature detectors'. However, during ontogeny, the gull 
chick's response alters, such that effective models must 
more closely resemble the parent's head (Hailman, 1962; 1967). 
The evidence suggests the development of a "qualitatively 
~ore precise Gestalt" (Hailman, 1970). The change appears to 
be a result of specific experience with an environmental 
object (usually the parent}, because chicks can be taught to 
prefer a model of another species (Hailman, 1967) and to 
respond preferentially to an originally non-preferred stimulus 
(Schmerler & Hailman, 1965). 
It seems then, that in the laughing gull chick's 
form-movement discrimination we can see a change in the mode 
of perceptual processing from a stimulus summation process to 
a Gestalt perception process. The use of the latter strategy, 
in this case at least, appears to require experience with 
stimulus objects. 
Hailrnan (1970) makes some generalizations based on 
these and other examples: that coding may take place in 
serial steps as1 neural information is sent to the brain; 
that,it appears that the further the units are from the 
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initial receptors, the more complex they become (as regards 
the nature of the external stimuli effective in exciting 
them); and that a given degree ·of complexity may be found 
in different loci in the sensory systems of different animal 
species. From this, he defines the coding mechanism for 
releasing stimuli as "the entire sensory system up to and 
including the level at which single units respond to a stimulus 
that is isomorphic with the releasing stimulus for behaviour 
of the whole animal" (Hailman, 1970). 
However, he notes Erickson's (1963) argument, from 
studies of the coding of learnable sensory discriminations, 
that there are no single units responsive to stimuli isomorphic 
with releasing stimuli - that the relevant neural information 
is contained in the amount of neural responses across many 
units. Hailman suggests that the coding for stereotyped, 
species-typical perceptual preferences (as evidenced in the 
so-called 'fixed action patterns') might be organized 
differently from the coding that underlies learnable discrimina-
tions. 
It is possible that in the laughing gull chick's 
form-movement discrimination, we see a change from a stereo-
typed, species-typical perceptual preference to a learnable 
sensory discrimination - thus a change from a process using 
single units responsive to stimuli isomorphic with releasing 
stimuli to one in which the relevant information is contained 
in patterns of neural activity. 
The development of a stimulus summation process to a 
Gestalt perception process during the course of ontogeny is 
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also seen in behavioural experiments with human babies, such 
as the evidence that over the first six months of life, faces 
come to be recognized less by their single components and 
more by the "integrated" configuration (Bower, 1966). 
To quote Hebb (1949): "Animal experiments and the 
human clinical data alike indicate that the perception of 
simple diagrams as distinctive wholes is not immediately given 
but slowly acquired through learning". 
The point is made by Ewert (1980) that "unambiguous 
classification of a configurational stimulus to a category of 
meaning is lar..gely independent of variations of certain other 
parameters ... The construction of invariants appears to be a 
precondition for Gestalt perception." The construction of 
invariants (note that if invariants simply resulted from the 
absence of appropriate detectors then 'construction' would be 
inappropriate terminology) points to the fact that some 
information comes to be regarded as significant and some is 
not. In so far as the active selection of significant 
information (i.e. a selection process which is not merely a 
function of what the organism can detect) is not part of the 
type of passive, hierarchical system postulated by Hubel & 
Wiesel, the construction of invariants challenge this type of 
process (note: the construction of invariants has not been 
revealed by single-unit recording methods (Ewert, 1980)). 
Moreover, it suggests the requirement of the active selection 
of significant information before a Gestalt perception process 
can develop. This is compatible with the evidence that 
learning, or at least experience with appropriate stimuli, 
is required before the stimuli can be processed as an 
integrated whole. 
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It seems refsonable to suggest then, that Gestalt 
processing is always preceded by sti~ulus summation processing, 
ontogenetically speaking, and thus allays co-exists with it. 
This is what is predicted by the thesis that stimulus 
summation processing evolutionarily preceded Gestalt processing, 
and that the two modes of processing co-exist in any organism 
capable of Gestalt processing. 
However, Gestalt perception processing is a mode of 
processing which occurs at the second level of information 
processing systems {see 4.1), and it is the cognitive processes 
(third level) which are said to represent a qualitative 
difference in the evolution of intelligent behaviour. The 
relationship between the processes at the two levels is seen 
as being that the development of Gestalt processing of 
perceptual stimuli necessitated a change from a "definitional" 
cognitive process (.that is, one based on the independent 
processing of primitive features and their integration by 
simple summation-type rules) to a "probabilistic" cognitive 
process (that is, one based on the assessed similarity of 
patterns). 
From this, we can make two testable predictions: 
(i} that animals who demonstrate a capacity for Gestalt 
processing will also demonstrate the use of a 
"probabilistic" cognitive process in appropriate 
circumstances; and 
(iii)_ that animals who only have a capacity for stimulus 
summation processing will only use a "definitional" 
cognitive process. 
The nature of the cognitive processes evidenced by 
diverse species is the subject of the next section. 
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5.3 COGNITIVE PROCESSES IN NON-HUMAN SPECIES 
5.3.1 Prey Recognition in Frogs and Toads 
The main impetus for a feature-detector approach to 
object recognition in non-human species, (aside from 
intellectual conviction), comes from a series of experimental 
studies on frogs (Barlow, 1953; Lettvin, Maturana, McCulloch 
& Pitts, 1959). To very briefly summarize their findings, 
it appears that a frog's eye is equipped to extract four 
patterns of information: 
(i) edge detectors, that respond to the border between 
light and dark areas; 
(ii) moving contrast detectors, that respond when an edge 
(iii) 
moves; 
dimming detectors, that respond when overall 
illumination is lowered; and 
(iv} convex edge detectors, that respond to small, dark, 
roughly circular, moving objects. 
These detectors are sufficient to enable the frog to 
be warned of possible danger (by the presence of moving 
shadows) and to catch flying insects. 
However, as Grusser & Grusser-Cornehls (1968) have shown, 
every effective stimulus that evokes a particular kind of 
response also triggers several classes of neuron. It appears 
therefore, that perception of prey is not coded by a single 
class of neurons, but by the relative patterns of activities 
in the four classes (.Hailman, 1970). That the integration of 
this information is a result of a simple summation process of 
the sort that is characteristic of a 'definitional' cognitive 
process is supported by the recent experimental work under-
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taken by Ewert intofprey recognition in toads. 
One of the major features of im\ortance for toads in 
identifying prey, is the direction of movement relative to 
the object's long axis. The discrimination between a stripe 
moving in the direction of its long axis and one moving 
perpendicular to it (what Ewert calls the "worm-antiworm" 
discrimination), appears to be innate, demonstrable 
immediately on the toad's metamorphis to the terrestrial 
environment. 
The main points of interest regarding prey recognition 
in toads are summarized below (from Ewert, 1982): 
(i) the worm-antiworm discrimination is unaffected by 
alterations in plane orientation; 
tiil however, within the vertical plane, toads are more 
( iii) 
responsive to upward movements than downward; 
this effect is particularly eviderit when the shape 
of the stimulus is less like that of natural prey; 
(iv) stimuli on homogenous backgrounds are not detected 
when the luminance of stimulus and background is the 
same, but equal luminosity doesn't affect detectability 
when the background is structured (i.e. patterned); 
tvl the worm-antiworm discrimination is not disturbed by 
a structured background; 
(vi) discrimination of small (black) 'worms' of different 
lengths is better on a structured background, but 
white 'worms' are apparently masked by it; 
(vii) stationary stimuli, and ones moved with (rather than 
against) the background, are also apparently masked 
by a structured background; and 
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(viii) there are tat least) four main types of feature 
which come to govern prey selection with experience: 
area components, tips leading the stimulus in the 
direction of movement, isolated dots, and striped 
patterns (all components of natural prey). 
The ability of toads to classify stimuli on the basis of 
experience has been demonstrated in several studies (Schneider, 
1954; Ewert, 1968; Brzoska & Schneider, 1978). 
Neurophysiological studies have found a number of 
different neurons involved in the discrimination process. 
Retinal ganglion cells are sensitive to stimulus area and, 
as regards configuration, principally sensitive to lengthen-
ing of the stimulus perpendicular to the direction of move-
ment. One of the classes of neurons in the caudal dorsal 
thalamus and pretectal region is sensitive to the entire 
area of a moving stimulus, and to elongation perpendicular 
to the direction of movement. A type of neuron in the optic 
tectum is sensitive to the entire area of a moving stimulus, 
and to expansion in a horizontal direction of movement. 
Other neurons in the same region are stimulated by perpendicu-
lar elongation, and inhibited by horizontal expansion. No 
neurons have been found which respond selectively to a 
stimulus of one particular configuration. 
These classes of neurons which have been identified 
by Ewert have been given by him the general name of "Gestalt 
?ecoders". We may say that these Gestalt decoders usually 
have ellipsoidal, radially symmetrical receptive fields, 
which evaluate the orientation of a stripe pattern relative 
to its movement direction. In contrast, the classical 
"orientation detectors" of Hubel & Wiesel have longitudinal 
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receptive fields which evaluate the orientation of a stripe 
pattern in relation to the orientation\of the main axis. 
Orientation detectors (so-called "simple cells") can extract 
the background structure from a stimulus even when both 
are moving together - an ability which Gestalt decoders lack. 
However, if the background is structured (surely a more 
natural situation), Gestalt decoders maintain their selectivity, 
while orientation detectors do not. In some respects then, 
it appears that the toad's Gestalt decoders share some of the 
functional properties of complex and hypercomplex cells in 
the mammalian visual system (Ewert, 1980). 
However, as Ewert points out, the evidence that toads 
can distinguish detailed structures within a functional 
classification (such as prey) cannot be readily explained 
on the basis of simple Gestalt classi~ication. Ewert and 
von Seelen ll974l have put forward a general model of 
n~uronal processing within which Ewert (1982) suggests that 
the processes of prey recognition evidenced by the toad, are 
explicable. In brief, this model describes a processing 
system in which the neuronal units associated with the 
configurational and featural cues governing prey recognition 
are integrated by a relatively simple summation-type 
process, described by Ewert as involving filter operations 
in the space and time domain and a weighted two-dimensional 
subtraction of stimulus distributions. 
Very generally then, it seems fair to suggest that 
in the toad, we have an example of configurational stimuli 
being isomorphic with single units in the input system, and 
'cognitive' processing by summation-type integration of 
configurational units (i.e. definitional). 
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5.3.2 Prey Recognition in Jumping Spiders 
Although comparatively simple creatures in many 
respects, salticids possess a visual system that rivals that 
of many mammals in its sophistication. The main points of 
interest regarding salticids' recognition of prey are: 
(1) the hunting behaviour pattern is made up of a number 
of separable units, each of which is released by 
different stimuli; 
(21 the stimulus characteristics of principal importance 
are size, speed of movement and solidity, and it is 
the interaction of these properties that chiefly 
determines which behavioural unit is triggered 
(Drees, 1952; Land, 1969); 
(3) in some situations, geometrical features also appear 
to be relevant - again, in interaction with the other 
factors (Forster, 1979a); and 
(4) the features of significance appear to be such 
characteristics as roundness and symmetry (Forster, 
1979b). 
Thus, for example, stationary stimuli of whatever nature 
are totally ignored if 5 cm or more away; two-dimensional 
stationary stimuli are still ignored at less than 5 cm 
distant; if solid, 5 mm models are responded to less often 
than 2 mm models; while a dead fly is responded to more 
frequently still. Again, two-dimensional stimuli induce 
hunting responses when moved at a rate of about 1 cm/second, 
releasing orientation and running at a distance of 10 cm; at 
a speed of about 0.5 cm/second, the same behaviour is released, 
but the critical distance and the intensity of the response 
is smaller; at a speed of about 0.25 cm/second, stimuli are 
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effective only at a maxim~m distance of about 4 cm. 
As with the frogs, it appears that re~ognition of prey 
\ 
is based on the interaction of several receptor systems 
(Forster, 1979a; 1979b). However, the evidence supports the 
view that this is a passive process; there is no evidence 
that salticids can learn to modify their classification of 
prey objects (Drees, 1952), nor that their recognition of 
prey is other than innate. 
In jumping spiders then, it would appear that a 
passive process involving the combination of features 
isomorphic with single units in the input system (like those 
demonstrated in the simple perceptual discriminations detailed 
in 5.2) underlies prey recognition. 
5.3.3 Prey Recognition in Cuttlefish 
A far more sophisticated system is observable in 
cuttlefish (Sepia), and was investigated by Wells (1962). 
Here, recognition of mysids (a type of shrimp) appears to 
be innate. However, after five to ten experiences with 
mysids, young Sepia begin to generalize. This generalization 
appears to be based on physical similarity to the 'proto-
typical' mysid, and some of the features that are significant 
are: movement along the long axis, rather than up and down; 
size; elongate shape; contrast with background. The precise 
nature of the perceived similarity could not, however, be 
determined - although it is interesting to note that the 
model that was most effective was also the one that looked 
most like a mysid to the experimenters. 
The extent of the generalisation varied considerably 
among the young cuttlefish, but sometime after the first month 
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of life, they begin to develop more selectivity. This 
selectivity appears to result from the experiences the 
individual Sepia have with various prey. Their failure to 
learn earlier is correlated with the late development of the 
vertical lobe - a neural structure known to be involved in 
learning and memory. 
Sepia then, appear to demonstrate a process of prey 
recognition based on: 
(a) innate recognition of one type of natural prey; 
(b) generalization through physical similarity; and 
Cc) appropriate modification of generalization through 
learning. 
It appears clear that prey recognition in the adult 
cuttlefish involves an active (i.e. inductive) selection 
process. Moreover, the process of recognition appears to be 
based on similarity judgements rather than on sets of 
defining features and rules for their combination - that is, 
on a 'probabilistic' cognitive process. 
5.3.4 Comparison of Processes of Prey Recognition in 
Different Animal Species 
Research on frogs suggests that they have detectors 
which are responsive to a particular type of configuration -
namely' "small, dark, circular, moving" objects. However, it 
seems that the responsivity of the single units is not uniquely 
specifiable - that is, single units respond to multivariate 
stimulus features. It is likely that prey recognition is 
based on a simple summation-type process which integrates 
features isomorphic with single units. While we lack the 
data to state this with any surety, the classification of 
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prey in frogs does not appea~ to be a flexible one - that 
is, it is probably innate and not modifiable by fndividual 
experience. The process of prey recognition in frogs thus 
is probably an essentially passive one - wholly compatible 
with the traditional assumption that non-human species 
identify stimuli according to specific criterial features 
to which particular neurons or receptors are sensitive, and 
a genetic predisposition to perceive the environment in a 
particular way. 
Recent research on prey recognition in toads suggests 
a process whereby an innate discrimination of a particular 
type of configuration (which is detectable by a single type 
of neuron}, moving in a specific fashion and interacting with 
'rules' regarding how the environment is perceived, is 
modifiable by experience. From the toads' experience with 
prey, other more subtle features can come to govern prey 
selection. It is clear that the process of prey recognition 
is not a peripheral mechanism, but rather a function of a 
central processing system. Moreover, the role of experience 
suggests that it is an active process, whereby the toads 
'select' the aspects of stimuli which are useful in 
identifying their category. 
Prey recognition in jumping spiders is a clearer 
example of the type of process hypothesised as occurring in 
frogs. The clear innate quality, and unmodifiability of the 
prey classification, is evidence of the passive nature of the 
process. Recognition appears to be a function of a simple 
summation process acting on features isomorphic with single 
units. 
Cuttlefish on the other hand, demonstrate beautifully 
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the development of a process of prey recognition. Recognition 
is initially innate, and specific to a particular configura-
tion; but it then generalizes according to physical 
similarity, later becoming more selective as the cuttlefish 
gains experience with prey objects. Prey recognition in the 
~dult cuttlefish is a clear example of an active selection 
process underlying a 'probabilistic' cognitive process. 
5.3.5 Bat-Call Recognition in Moths 
A behaviour which is highly adaptive and appropriately 
variable, but without doubt 'instinctive', is the recognition 
of bat calls by many nocturnal moths. Because bats prey on 
moths, an ability to avoid bats is clearly of considerable 
value to moths. Many species have evolved auditory organs 
which are capable of detecting bat chirps at a distance far 
greater than the sensory range of a bat. Depending on how 
close the bat is, the moth will respond to its presence by 
either turning away or diving to the ground (Roeder, 1966). 
This strategically sound behaviour is based on a 
system of beautiful simplicity. The moth has aural detectors 
which are triggered only by sounds in the 17-100 kHz band 
(ultrasound). It has no way of discriminating between sounds 
in this range, except by loudness. The presence of two 
sound-sensitive cells, each with different thresholds, allows, 
by their differential responsivity, a distinction to be made 
between 'near' and 'far'. 
This is clea~ly an example of perceptual discrimination 
which is passive, and determined simply by the existence of 
appropriate detectors. 
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5.3.6 Frog Recognition *f Mating Calls 
On the other hand, the ability of fr\gs to recognise 
and respond selectively to a number of different frog calls, 
is much less explicable in these simple terms. 
One series of experiments that ha~ been done in this 
area (Capranica, 1965; Frishkopf, Capranica & Goldstein, 
1968} has investigated the ability of male northern bullfrogs 
to distinguish the mating calls of conspecifics from those of 
33 other anuran species. It appears that the basis of this 
discrimination - which is readily made - is found in the 
following spectral characteristics of this species' mating 
call: 
( i) pulse repetition rate of 100 Hz; 
( ii) energy in the low region (centred at 200 Hz) ; 
(iii) energy in the high region (centred at 1400 Hz) ; and 
(iv} less energy in the medium region (centred at 500 Hz) 
than in the low region. (from Brown, 1975) 
The interesting point to note is that, although there 
exist 2 types of neuron in the bullfrog's auditory nerve, of 
which one is most sensitive in the low frequency band and 
the other in the high, recognition is plainly not simply a 
function of exciting neurons. Not all sounds which excite 
the neurons evoke the appropriate response - only sounds with 
a certain relationship among low, medium and high frequencies. 
This it seems is because sounds in the medium range inhibit 
neurons with a low threshold. However, if responses were 
solely determined by the peripheral mechanism, loud sounds 
would be effective even without the correct spectral 
characteristics. As they are not, it is clear that some 
central, top-down processing is involved. The discrimination 
made by the bullfrog is, after all, subtler than that of 
simply recognising conspecifics. Sounds evoke a number of 
diverse behaviours, including calls of various kinds, and 
responses such as escape. 
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It would seem from this description, brief as it is, 
that the classification of calls by northern bullfrogs is 
interpretable in terms of a set of defining features (sensory 
in nature} and rules for their relationship. However, the 
lack of information on the effect, if any, of experience in 
modifying call classifications, means that we have no 
independent assessment on whether an active selection process 
is involved. 
5.3.7 Frog-Call Recognition by Bats 
Another, possibly more sophisticated, example of call 
recognition, is that which is displayed by the frog-eating 
bat. It has been demonstrated that this bat uses frog calls 
not only as a means of locating its prey, but also as a means 
of discriminating between frogs of different sizes and 
palatibilities (Ryan & Tuttle, 1981). A·further study by 
Ryan & Tuttle (1983) followed up their earlier demonstration 
that in a simultaneous choice test, the bats will avoid the 
call of the poisonous.toad Bufo typhonius. In this study, 
they were attempting to determine whether the discrimination 
between poisonous and non-poisonous prey was a definite 
(i.e. either/or) discrimination or whether the calls were 
assessed in a graded fashion, perhaps on the basis of 
similarity to the call of B. Typhonius. 
In the experiment, pairs of novel frog calls which to 
the researchers' formed a continuum of increasing similarity 
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to B. Typhonius, were used. The preferences showed by the 
bats in simultaneous choice tests were compl,tely in agreement 
with the similarity judgements, suggesting that, not only is 
call preference based on similarity to B. typhonius calls, 
but the bats are assessing similarity in a manner like that 
of humans. The actual basis of that similarity is obscure, 
although temporal properties of the calls seem to be of 
primary importance. Acoustical analysis of the calls revealed 
no clear patterns. 
In summary, it would appear that call recognition in 
the frog-eating bat is based on spectral characteristics, 
probably principally of a temporal nature; but that these 
properties cannot be thought of (as the previous example was) 
in terms of defining features and rules for their relationship. 
Instead, it seems likely that a more 'probabilistic' cluster 
of properties forms the basis for recognition - a recognition 
based on similarity assessments, and influenced by contextual 
cues (note the implication of these results, that the bat's 
response would be affected by other calls, if frogs of more 
than one species were calling at the same time). 
5.3.8 Comparison of Processes of Call Recognition in 
Different Animal Species 
Four examples of the diverse capacities for call 
recognition that exist among different species, have been 
given. The first, that of bat-call recognition in nocturnal 
moths, is an example of an adaptive, instinctive behaviour 
which is based on a beautifully simple feature-detector system. 
The example of how the northern bullfrog recognizes 
its conspecifics' mating call, demonstrated a process which 
requires some central involvement, and which is probably 
interpretable in terms of defining features and rules. 
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The frog-eating bat on the other hand, appears to be 
capable of assessing the calls of different species of frog 
and toad, in terms of their similarity to the call of a 
particular poisonous toad. This similarity judgement does 
not appear to be based on defining features, but appears to 
be like that found in humans, that is, based on similarity 
judgements. 
5.4 DISCRIMINATION IN ARTIFICIAL TEST SITUATIONS 
Much of the work in the field of animal discrimination 
has consisted of behavioural experiments designed to determine 
which features of shapes are detected and used to classify the 
shapes as the same or different from one another. Basically, 
these experiments involve matching-to-sample tasks, oddity 
tasks, or a combination of both (i.e. the animal is required 
to respond to two stimuli being the 'same' or 'different'). 
There are two approaches commonly used to determine the 
discrimination abilities of animals; the first involves 
training the subject to respond to a positive stimulus given 
a choice of two stimuli (using operant conditioning techniques), 
and comparing the rates of learning of different pairs of 
discriminations. The second involves the use of transfer 
I 
tests, i.e. tests of the discrimination demonstrated between 
novel stimuli on the basis of cues learned in an earlier 
discrimination. The first of these demonstrates the relative 
ease of learning different discriminations, but it is the 
second which is more informative regarding the classification 
of stimuli as 'same' or 'different'. 
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Studies of shape discrim~nation have been carried out 
on fish, octopi, birds, rats, cats, primates, and ,other 
\ 
mammals. Unfortunately, research has not been carTied out in 
such a way that a systematic comparison of species differences 
and similarities is possible. However, some of the characteris-
tics of discrimination in a few different animal species are 
discussed below. 
5.4.1 Shape Discrimination in Goldfish 
The discrimination abilities of goldfish have been 
studied in a reasonably systematic and extensive manner (see 
Mackintosh & Sutherland, 1963; Bowman & Sutherland, 1969a; 
Sutherland & Bowman, 1969b; Sutherland, 1969; and Bowman & 
Sutherland, 1970). The experiments involved training the 
goldfish to respond to one of a pair of shapes, and, when 
the goldfish had reached criterion (usually 90% correct 
respon~es), replacing the stimuli with a variety of transfer 
shapes. The main points of interest are: 
(i) goldfish tend to give much greater significance to 
differences in features in the top halves of shapes 
than those in the bottom halves; 
Cii) when the stimuli were changed from black on a white 
background to white on black (or vice versa), transfer 
was good but not complete; 
(iii) better transfer was evidenced when the size of the 
stimulus was increased rather than decreased, and an 
increase of four times the original stimulus lead to 
performance better than that to the original stimulus; 
(iv) transfer occurred when some shapes were rotated but 
not on others (e.g. transfer occurred when 'W' and 'V' 
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0 0 shapes were rotated 90 or 180 , but did not occur 
between a square and a diamond); 
the discrimination of shapes whose point of difference 
is a horizontal vs vertical orientation is significantly 
easier than that of shapes which have oblique contours 
0 0 (i.e. oriented at 45 & 135 angles), but both are 
discriminable; 
(vi} transfer occurred from square to horizontal and 
vertical rectangles, but not to oblique rectangles; 
likewise, transfer occurred from diamond to oblique 
rectangles, but not to horizontal or vertical ones 
(confirming that the orientation of the contours is 
(vii} 
a significant feature for goldfish); and 
goldfish showed significant transfer to an outline 
parallelogram when presented with a circle, but gave 
no significant transfer to an outline square presented 
with a circle (but note that goldfish discriminated 
more readily between the original parallelogram and 
the circle than between the original square and the 
circle) . 
5.4.2 Comparison with Rats and Octopi 
A comparison of discrimination in goldfish with that in 
rats and octopi (see Sutherland, 1969), indicates a number of 
interesting similarities and differences. Thus, transfer to 
smaller and larger shapes was evidenced by all three species, 
but whereas rats demonstrated a significantly better transfer 
to a large parallelogram than to a small, and no significant 
difference in transfer between a smaller and a larger square; 
octopi transferred better to a larger square than a small, 
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and on a smaller parallelogram than a large.. Goldfish on 
the other hand, showed a tendency to respond like rfts, but 
the difference in performance did not reach signifi6ant levels. 
Pairing a vertical and horizontal rectangle demonstrated 
a tendency in rats, as in goldfish, to treat the horizontal 
rectangle as the original parallelogram and the vertical 
rectangle as the original square if trained on the horizontal 
parallelogram (vice versa if trained on the vertical parallelo-
gram). In successive tests hq:wever, the rats trained on the 
vertical parallelogram showed excellent transfer from the 
square to a parallelogram with long side horizontal but no 
transfer at all to a parallelogram with long side vertical, 
while the other group of rats showed little transfer to either. 
It seems therefore that rats do not classify either horizontal 
or vertical rectangles as equivalent to the original parallelo-
gram, but that on simultaneous presentation the rectangle 
oriented similarly to the shape on which the rat was trained, 
appears less like a square than the alternate rectangle. 
Octopi on the other hand, do tend· to categorize horizontal 
and vertical rectangles with the original parallelogram rather 
than the square. 
The results of tests with several different pairs of 
shapes indicate that rats learn the orientation of the oblique 
lines in the parallelogram and discriminate shapes containing 
oblique lines of the same orientation from ones with lines 
0 rotated through 90 . Octopi however, did not appear to find 
this property significant. The results of the tests with 
goldfish indicated that the orientation of oblique contours 
was significant for them, but not to the extent that it was 
for rats. 
Both rats and octopi tend to classify circles and 
diamonds with squares as opposed to parallelograms, with 
ci1cles being significantly more easily confused with the 
square than is the diamond. Goldfish in contrast, more 
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readily confuse the circle with the parallelogram. They 
also tend to confuse the circle with the square, but not at 
a significant level. 
Transfer to an outline square and parallelpgram was 
good but not complete in rats, with a tendency to be better 
to the parallelogram than the square. In octopi however, 
while similar results were obtained in simultaneous testing, 
in successive tests they demonstrated almost perfect transfer 
to the outline parallelogram but none at all to the square. 
Results of the tests with goldfish suggest that, like rats, 
they transfer better to outline parallelograms than squares, 
but the results were not conclusive. 
5.4.3 Characteristics of Shape Discrimination in Animals 
Experimental evidence indicates that many species are 
able to classify a shape as the same over a considerable range 
of size change. Ho~ever, the extent to which size change is 
significant appears to vary across species, and across types 
of shape within species. It also appears that this capacity 
is innate and not a function of eye movements (see Ganz & 
Wilson, 19 67) . 
While there is some tendency to transfer when the 
brightness of a shape and its background is reversed, it 
appears to occur less often as shapes become less simple. 
While many animals successfully transfer a learned 
discrimination from filled-in shapes to outline shapes and 
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vice versa, it seems that this ability exists in different 
species in vafying degrees, and that the success and degree 
\ 
of transfer is a function of the type of shape. 
Although many species demonstrate some equivalence 
between a shape and its mirror-image, rotated shapes are not 
always treated as equivalent. While the recognition of some 
shapes when rotated is less disturbed than that of other 
shapes, the degree of rotation also appears to be a significant 
factor. 
Significant differences between species concerning 
which shapes are treated as equivalent are clearly demonstrated, 
and the obvious conclusion is that different features are 
significant for different species. This is supported by the 
evidence that different species attend to different areas of 
a pattern. However, the possibility must be admitted that 
apparent species differences may be a function of differences 
in experimental design, the importance of which is indicated 
by the finding that different results are recorded depending 
on whether differential or nondifferential training, and if 
differential whether interdimensional or intradimensional 
training, is given. Results are also clearly influenced by 
a host of other methodological distinctions, such as whether 
presentation of stimuli is successive or simultaneous, and 
whether reinforcement is continuous or intermittent. 
Many animals exhibit interocular transfer (i.e. a shape 
discrimination learned using one eye successfully transfers 
when the other eye is used). Additionally, intra-retinal 
transfer has been demonstrated in goldfish (Cronly-Dillon, 
Sutherland & Wolfe, 1966). 
These characteristics point out the phenomena that 
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must be explained by any adequate theory of patttrn recognition. 
Following Sutherland (1968) we may list nine conditions that 
must be fulfilled by such a theory (note that these conditions 
are not exhaustive): 
(i) size invariance - why discrimination can successfully 
transfer when the sizes of shapes are altered, and 
also why the transfer is better for some sizes and 
shapes than others; 
(ii) retinal position - how a discrimination learned via 
one part of the retina is transferred to another part 




brightness invariance - what governs whether or not 
brightness reversal will allow transfer; 
equivalence of outline and filled-in shapes - why do 
some shapes transfer better than others when reduced 
to an outline and how does it occur at all; 
(v} non-equivalence of rotated shapes - what governs 
whether or not a rotated shape will transfer; 
(vi) confusions between shapes - why are some shapes, quite 
dissimilar to humans, treated as equivalent by some 
other species; 
(vii) jitter - what allows an animal to disregard varying 
degrees of distortion of a shape, and what is the 
extent of variation permissable before the shape 
cannot be identified; 
(viii) segmentation - while very little work has been done 
specifically on the ability of non-human species to 
segment a pattern (but see Cerella's study quoted in 5.4.5) 
work done with humans implies it is important for 
pattern recognition; 
(ix) physiological evidence - naturally, any theory of 
pattern refognition requires ~be compatible with 
I 
the physiological evidence. 
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The theory of pattern recognition proposed by 
Sutherland (1968) is that "animals store a highly abstract 
description of the input shape". The invariances evidenced 
in shape recognition make it clear that this process cannot 
be explained solely by the feature extractor mechanisms 
discovered by Hubel & ~ie~el (Sutherland, 1969). Sutherland 
suggests that two distinct stages are involved. The first 
is the extraction of local features (such as segments and edges 
lying in particular orientations), together with preservation 
of spatial relationships by retinotopic mapping. The second 
is the forming of a rule describing the shape in terms of 
its local features (e.g. "H" can be described as two vertical 
lines of equal length with their midpoints joined by a 
shorter horizontal line) - a rule which expresses how the 
features are combined. "Since the same shape can be described 
by many different rules, the process of rule formation will 
contain elements akin to induction." (Sutherland, 1969) 
Species differences in feature detectors or in the 
way rules are formed, are considered to be responsible for 
the differences in experimental results between, for example, 
octopi and goldfish. Thus Sutherland suggests that rats 
discriminate mainly in terms of the presence vs absence of 
oblique contours in a particular orientation in the lower 
half of shapes, while octopi discriminate mainly on the basis 
of the presence or absence of thin horizontal or vertical 
segments (where 'thin segment' refers to any part of a shape 
where two edges are separated by only a small gap). Goldfish 
105 
on the other hand, seem to rely heavily on the presenre vs 
absence of oblique contours but their orientation is not 
signficant to them. The presence or absence of horizontal 
and vertical segments is also of some significance to them. 
However, it is noted that, while the shape discrimina-
tion experiments provide clear evidence that goldfish can 
readily detect differences between two shapes that are only 
a matter of detail, octopi readily discriminate between 
shapes whose main masses are differently distributed, but 
are poor at discerning details. Sutherland interprets the 
clear difference in the way goldfish and octopi encode 
visually presented patterns, as reflecting phyletic differences 
in feature detectors or in the way rules are formed. However, 
it appears equally (and maybe more) valid to suggest that 
there are in fact fundamentally different processes going on 
in the two species. 
It also seems that the design of the experiments begs 
the demonstration of this type of process. A number of 
experiments undertaken in the laboratory in recent years, 
have looked at the ability of non-human animals (specifically, 
pigeons} to recognize ill-defined categories. A discussion 
of this evidence is preceded by a brief look at the results 
of some of the tests of shape discrimination carried out on 
pigeons. 
5.4.4 Shape Discrimination in Pigeons 
The transfer of a learned discrimination between a 
triangle and a square to figures which vary in systematic ways 
was investigated by Towe (1952). His principal findings were 
that: 
(i) the discrimination did not transfer to rotated figures; 
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(ii) f transfer did occur when the cues were reduced by 
removal of a segrent from the figures, except that 
\ 
(iii) 
reduction to dot figures resulted in a failure to 
transfer; 
transfer occurred when the size of the figure was 
altered (although a tendency to prefer the larger 
figure was observed); 
(iv) the discrimination transferred when the brightness 
was reversed; and 
(v} transfer occurred to a variety of distorted figures. 
The affect of altered orientation of pigeons' recognition 
of stimuli as 'same' or 'different' was investigated in greater 
detail by Reynolds (l961). In this study, pigeons were 
trained to respond to an upright isosceles triangle, and then 
given transfer tests using systematic rotations of the triangle. 
Reynolds found that pigeons did transfer to rotated figures, 
and performance was better to rotations of 160° to 200° than 
to some intermediate values (e.g. 90° to 130°). 
Similarly, Vetter & Hearst (1968) investigated the 
discrimination of rotated parallelograms, following Rausch's 
discovery (1952) that humans perceived changes in shape with 
the rotation of a parallelogram, and that parallelograms with 
horizontal.and vertical diagonals were perceived as similar 
while those with two horizontal or vertical sides were placed 
in another group (note that parallelograms of the former group 
are much further apart from each other in terms of tilt than 
a parallelogram from each group would be). In Vetter & 
Hearst's study, it was found that, while non-differential 
training produced little stimulus control along the dimension 
of orientation, pigeons whose training had included trials 
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in which the parallelogram was absent, responded to 
l 
orientations of o0 (i.e. the orientation of the training 
stimulus), -90° and +90° much more than to orientations of 
0 0 -+40 and -+50 . This discrimination between parallelograms 
with horizontal and vertical diagonals (0°, +/-90°) and 
those with two horizontal or vertical sides (+-40°, +-50°) 
echoes Rausch's finding. It is interesting however, to note 
that the unimodal generalization gradient supposedly typical 
of an animal's responses to changes along a physical dimension 
(as opposed to the bimodal generalization gradient found in 
Vetter et al's experiment), could be produced by specific 
discrimination training along the orientation dimension 
(intradimensional training) . 
These experiments clearly indicate that degrees of 
angular rotation is not a sufficient or appropriate stimulus 
dimension in terms of rotational invariance. One possibility 
that Vetter & Hearst put forward was that the position of the 
vertices may be a relevant stimulus dimension for pigeons 
in parallelogram rotation. This possibility was investigated 
by Ferraro & Grisham {1972). They demonstrated that the 
distance of vertices movement from the training stimulus did 
indeed correlate with the speed of discrimination learning, 
and that the direction of vertices movement was also 
significant. However, stimulus control along a dimension 
of the distance of vertices movement depended upon prior 
intradimensional training. 
5.4.5 Natural Concepts in Pigeons 
There is another way of looking at the results of the 
experiments into shape discrimination in pigeons however, and 
that is, to note that the transfer, where it occurs, is not 
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comp¾ete. Vetter & Hearst's study tells us that rotation 
does make a difference; Wildemann & Holland {1973) looked 
at the effects of altering size using a circle as training 
stimulus, and found responses to the altered stimuli were 
lower; Heinemann & Kadison (1976) found that varying the 
location of the stimulus (a spot) disrupted the pigeon's 
recognition of the pattern. 
It appears then, that these alterations of size, 
rotation and position, are signif.icant to the pigeon. Such 
data may be interpreted as suggestive of a template-matching 
system (Cerella, (_19 82) . However, investigations into the 
ability of a pigeon to disregard these alterations have not 
supported this view (see, e.g., Blough's {1979) finding 
that pigeons can discriminate the letter 'O' from the letter 
'X' across 16 stimulus locations; and Morgan, Fitch, Holman 
& Lea's (1976) evidence for successful discrimination of the 
letter 'A' and the digit '2' across 18 different typefaces). 
The suggestion has be~n made (see Cerella, 1982) that 
pigeons can form a prototype by averaging a number of 
exemplars, and then use this prototype to identify new 
exemplars. Cerella reports that, when the training stimuli 
were random distortions of two prototypes (a square and a 
chevron}, pigeons' responses to individual patterns indeed 
varied with their distortion from the prototypes. The use 
of 'natural _concepts' as stimuli in tests of discrimination 
provide an approach which may help answer this question. 
An initial study (Herrnstein & Loveland, _1964) involved 
the training of pigeons {using operant conditioning 
techniques) to respond to the presence or absence of human 
beings in photographs. Over 1200 colour slides of natural 
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settings were used, and in each session about half the 
slides included at least one human being. The experimenter 
could not find any other systematic way in which the slides 
varied. Using rate of pecking as a measure of whether the 
concept was learned, all five subjects showed a significant 
differential response towards the two classes of slides. 
This study was extended by Siegel & Honig (1970), 
who confirmed that pigeons demonstrated a discrimination 
learned on the basis of a variety of positive and negative 
stimuli, and transferred the discrimination to novel stimuli. 
The discrimination apparently could be learned using either 
simultaneous or successive presentation, and was maintained 
in tests where the pictures were inverted (i.e. rotated 180°) 
but not in tests wherein the picture was displayed out of 
focus (thus blurring the contours but maintaining the distri-
bution of colour). 
Reasoning that the concept of 'pigeon' would be more 
salient than that of 'human' to a pigeon, Poole & Lander 
(1971) investigated the pigeon's concept of 'pigeon'. As 
expected, the discrimination was learned very rapidly and 
more efficiently than that of 'human'. Indeed, the speed 
with which the discrimination was learned makes it clear that 
I 
it was only the nature of the task, rather than the concept 
itself, that was required to be learned. 
It was also found that pictures of other birds were 
responded to more often than that of other negative stimuli, 
implying that there were some shared characteristics between 
birds and pigeons, but that, as the response to pigeons was 
significantly better than that to other birds, the concept 
of 'pigeon' was more specific than that of 'bird'. It is 
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also!worthy of note that the concept was flexible enough to 
include fancy varieties\ of pigeon. 
In an effort to determine the minimal number of 
exemplars needed for a pigeon to learn the 'people' concept, 
Malott & Siddall (1972) used serial presentation (a design 
which uses discrete trials and continuous reinforcement, as 
opposed to the free operant design with intermittent reinforce-
ment which characterized the earlier studies). The results 
of this study indicated that a pigeon requires some 3 to 17 1 
positive and negative exemplars to reach the criterial level 
of discrimination, and showed that pigeons can rapidly form 
a complex concept using this experimental design. 
The ability of pigeons to form more complex concepts 
than that so far demonstrated, was investigated by Lubow 
(1974). The discrimination used was that between man-made 
objects and.non-man-made objects, and the main point of 
interest is Lubow's finding that, if the pigeons were 
discriminating on the basis of (a) presence of straight lines 
0 and/or 90 angles, and (b) light and dark areas, plus high 
contrast between them, plus half-and-half light-and-dark, 
then only 2 - 8% of the positive stimuli were unaccounted for. 
Other studies since then have demonstrated the pigeon's 
ability to discriminate trees, bodies of water, a particular 
woman (Herrnstein, Loveland & Cable, 1976; Herrnstein, 1979), 
oak leaves (Cerella, 1979), and fish (Herrnstein & de Villiers, 
1980). 
The interpretation of this research has not proved 
non-controversial. Herrnstein has taken the position that 
such discrimination abilities clearly demonstrate the 
holding of "highly numerous or infinite stimulus classes" 
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(Herrnstein, 1979), and thus suggests the usage of underlying 
I 
rules for classification rather than simply a set of defining 
features. 
As possible classification rules, he suggests those 
based on stimulus similarity (in the sense of proximity along 
standard physical dimensions). Lubow's study provides support 
for this. However, Herrnstein regards the ability of pigeons 
to correctly classify novel instances of trees, people, and 
oak leaves, as evidence that categories are not only, or all, 
formed on the basis of proximity on physical dimensions. 
This interpretation has not gone unchallenged. In 
particular, the assumption that classes such as 'trees' are 
not discriminable on the basis of a few common elements 
(presumably isomorphic with single neuronal units), has 
been questioned (see Premack, 1983). However, we may note 
that no-one has yet suggested a credible set of defining 
features upon which the demonstrated discriminations might 
be made. 
On the other hand, Cerella (1982) reports an experiment 
in which pigeons failed to demonstrate a discrimination based 
on the concept of 'tree'. Initially, the researcher (Anish, 
1978) trained pigeons to identify a single positive stimulus 
(a colour slide of a tree), using a variety of outdoor 
ltree-less) views as negative stimuli. No response to any of 
the test stimuli was evidenced. Anish followed this up with 
an experiment in which the training stimuli included several 
positive patterns, each slightly different. One group of 
subjects were trained on positive stimuli which shared the 
characteristics of being full-length views of medium-sized 
trees; the other group trained on close-up views of leaves 
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an~ twigs. When the pigeons were tested, it was found that 
the pigeons in each c\se responded to those test stimuli 
which were physically similar to the training stimuli, i.e. 
were full-length views of medium-sized trees, or close-up 
views of leaves and twigs (note how this relates to the 
finding of different effects following intradimensional vs 
interdimensional training, 5.4.4.). 
Cerella himself suggests that, in the light of this 
evidence, the results of the experiments using natural concepts 
may be understood by hypothesising tha~ such concepts are 
defined in terms of a set of "focal instances" (e.g. "male, 
front view, full figure, middle ground") and that subsets 
of physically similar instances surrounding each focal 
instance are reachable by a process of flexible template-
matching (although the idea of a flexible template implies 
a use of the word 'template' which is uncommon). The 
problems of how such properties as 'male' might be encoded, 
and what is meant by 'physical similarity, are glossed over 
by Cerella. Instead, he seems to regard the key issue as 
the flexibility of the·template-matching process, i.e. how 
many exemplars are 'covered' by a single template in relation 
to the total class; thus, how many templates are needed to 
represent a concept? 
Studies using artificial concepts may throw some light 
on this issue. One study (Cerella, 1982) investigated the 
ability of pigeons to identify pictures of the cartoon 
character Charlie Brown, from pictures of the other characters 
in the same cartoon strip. Test stimuli included incomplete, 
scrambled (_i.e. Charlie Brown was divided into three parts 
and the segments rearranged) and inverted images, as well as 
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complete but novel instances. The recognition of scra~led 
instances in particular appears to rule out a template 
model. Cerella consequently modified the model to use local 
rather than global templates. This is a misleading use of 
terms, because what he in fact has done is replace a template 
model with a feature-detector model. Still, the important 
point is that Cerella's experiment can be taken as support 
for the position that pigeons decompose patterns into sets 
of local features. The question of whether or not pigeons 
were aware of relationships between features was also 
investigated by Cerella (1977; 1979), who concluded on the 
basis of his experiments that they were not. However, the 
results of these experiments cannot, as he himself admits, 
be taken as conclusive, owing to various limitations of the 
stimuli used. 
Despite this evidence from Cerella, who seems, in the 
writer's opinion, to strain the data somewhat in attempting 
to find an explanation which is more in keeping with a 
passive, feature-extractor assumption, the evidence seems to 
support the view that pigeons are capable of classifying 
stimuli in a flexible manner. There does not appear to be 
any justification for different interpretations of similar 
behaviours demonstrated by humans and pigeons. 
5.5 CONCLUSIONS 
In the evolution of intelligent behaviour, we may see 
two paths. The first involves the development of an ability 
to infer rules which express the way in which features - also 
inferred as significant (rather than extracted as a function 
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of oniy having the appropriate 'feature extractors') -
are combined. This has teen termed the 'definitional' 
cognitive process, and its evolution is seen as being -an 
extension of the mode of perceptual processing termed the 
'stimulus summation process'. Thus, we can see a develop-
ment from: 
(it recognition of some functional classes (especially 
those involved in inflexible, stereotyped, 'instinctive' 
behaviours) as a function of passive coding mechanisms 
(in which, by the use of serial, progressively more 
complex, coding steps, recognition is by a one-to-one 
matching of 'releasing stimulus' with a single unit 
responsive to a stimulus isomorphic with that external 
stimulus); to 
(ii) recognition of some functional classes as a function 
(iii) 
of a simple summation process, in which features 
isomorphic with single units in the processing 
system are independently processed and integrated by a 
simple additive combination - a process which is again, 
essentially passive; to 
recognition involving the active selection of 
significant features (isomorphic with single units and 
independently processed) and induced rules for how 
these features are combined. 
On the other hand, the change in the nature of the 
feature implicit in the development of a Gestalt perceptual 
process, led to a different path. On this path, we can see 
the early development of an active selection process, as a 
consequence of the development of a capacity to learn from 
one's experiences. Given the ability to select what features 
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are significant, the ability to learn to perceive certa~n 
complex stimuli as "integrated wholes" rather than having 
to analyse them'step-by-step, could develop. The advantages 
accruing to such a process - particularly in terms of 
reduced processing time - made such a development inevitable 
once it was possible. However, the ability to perceive 
complex stimuli holistically is problematic for the informa-
tion-processing system. The holistic representation of 
stimuli is not processable by a 'definitional' cognitive 
process. Given holistic representations, the necessity to 
assess stimulus classifications on the basis of perceived 
'similarity' seems clear. Hence, the development of a 
'probabilistic• cognitive process seems inevitable, given 





6.1 THE NATURE OF INTELLIGENCE 
As we said in Chapter 2, what 'intelligence' means 
is a matter of definition; accordingly we may say that 
intelligence is "the ability to understand, reason and 
perceive; quickness in learning, mental alertness; ability 
to grasp relationships" (Penguin English Dictionary) with 
some assurance. From this known point however, the construc-
tion of more rigorous definitions becomes somewhat more 
conjectural. There are those who have attempted to define 
intelligence more precisely through tests of problem-solving 
abilities. Since it is self-evident (i.e. a matter of 
definition} that intelligence and problem-solving abilities 
are related in some way, it is hardly surprising that such 
a strategy has enjoyed some success in the purely practical 
matter of making limited predictions, on the basis of some 
assessed 'level' of intelligence. In other areas, and 
particularly in its explanatory power (none), the approach 
has proven inadequate. 
Some researchers maintain that intelligence should 
be defined simply as the ability to learn. Certainly "no-
one would want to argue that learning ability is not a 
component of intelligence" (Hunt, 1980). However, it seems 
clear from consideration of our 'intuitive' evaluations of 
various behaviours in non-human animals, that learning, 
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while no doubt highly correlated with intelligence, is noi 
of itself a sufficient basis for the judgement that 
intelligence is being demonstrated. 
In the more general question of intelligence among 
animals, rather than the specific one of the precise nature 
of human intelligence, we find that ethologists tend to 
describe behaviour as intelligent on the basis of its adaptive 
value and flexibility. The evaluation of intelligent behaviour 
on the basis of observable characteristics is without doubt 
a functional one, but it appears to be considerably removed 
from the meaning of intelligent as it is generally understood. 
Intuitive judgements of the behaviours of non-human 
animals have led the writer to postulate that the presumption 
of qualities such as purposiveness, judgement and choice, 
underlies our ascription of intelligence to behaviour. In 
some way, the selection of a course of action in any situation 
is presumed to be different in animals considered 'intelligent' 
from that of animals considered 'non-intelligent'. 
In the general context of "the organism as an 
information-processing system", which approach is assumed 
in this text, it seems reasonable to postulate that this 
difference has to do with the selection of the information 
which is used in 'deciding' what action to take. More 
specifically, it seems that the basis for the ascription 
of intelligence to behaviour, is the judgement that the 
organism is actively selecting the body of information 
(stored and situational) which is significant. In contrast, 
the selection process could be passive - determined by aspects 
of the input system, and automatic processing upon the 
input. 
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6.2 T~E SELECTION OF SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION 
In any situation, th\re is a vast amount of informa-
tion. To the animal in the situation, faced with the need 
to make some sort of behavioural response, some of this 
information is significant (that is, it will assist the 
animal in 'deciding on' an appropriate response), and some 
of it is not. To the common tick, waiting on a bush for a 
passing mammal, only two pieces of information are 
0 significant - a temperature of around 37 C and a smell of 
butyric acid. When these criterial features are observed 
in conjunction, the tick responds appropriately. One may 
speak of the tick's functional classification of 'mammal', 
but it is readily apparent that, although the classification 
is explicable in terms of 'definitional' theory, the 
process does not warrant the description of 'cognitive'. 
This is because the process is a purely mechanical one - the 
extraction of the significant information is a function of 
an extremely limited sensory system. 
On the other hand, it is clear that many animals 
birds and mammals in particular - have sensory systems 
capable of detecting a substantial amount of the information 
inherent in any situation. Humans for example, appear to 
have a memory system that holds a detailed image for a very 
brief time, of the information received at a particular sense 
organ. This "sensory information store" stores more informa-
tion than can be extracted, implying that there are limits 
on the capacity of later stages - limits not shared by the 
sensory stages themselves (Lindsay & Norman, 1972). 
Accordingly, it becomes necessary to postulate some top-down 
process which sorts this information into significant and 
irrelevant. 
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However, while the use of an active selection 
process may be a requirement for intelligent behaviour, 
there is rather more to the processing of information than 
the selection of the information to be processed. 
6.3 THE PROCESSING OF PERCEPTUAL INFORMATION 
As Dodwell (1978) says: " .. the ability to discriminate 
between different two-dimensional shapes may seem a simple 
matter, yet it cannot be understood in terms of an ordered 
set of physical parameters: the perceiving system itself 
must impose order where none is intrinsic to the stimulation 
or not obviously so. Similarly {conceptual) categorization ... 
can be simple or complex, but again implies the active engage-
ment of the organism in the perceptual process". 
It is evident that even at the first level of 
perceptual processing, there is rather more to the processing 
of stimuli than is involved in the traditional, reductionist 
approach, in which stimuli are assumed to be broken down into 
features isomorphic with single units in the input system. 
Some of the evidence relating to human processing 
at the levels of signal detection and pattern recognition, 
which challenges this approach (from Chapter 4), is 
summarized: 
(i} stimuli which may be defined as changes on (measur-
able} sensory dimensions, may be processed either 
holistically {as an integrated whole) or analytically 
(by independently processing separate elements of the 
stimulus}; which mode of processing is used is not 
purely determined by the nature of the stimulus, but 
is also governed by processor and task variables; 
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(ii) the u~e of holistic perceptual processing implies 
that in some situations,\ analysis may be less 
efficient or even inapprbpriate - holistic processing 
is faster, and puts less demand on the processing 
(iii) 
system; it is also probable that in some situations, 
the analysis of interdependent elements will lose 
significant information; 
at the level of pattern recognition, the illusory 
contours which are perceived by human observers in 
certain situations, and 'explained' by the Gestalt 
principles of organization, provide clear evidence 
that there are processes involved which are 
considerably more complex and globally organized 
than the extreme feature detector theories would 
suggest; 
livl a growing body of neurophysiological evidence supports 
the view that spatiotemporal patterns of neural 
activity are the basis of information processing, 
rather than single units; 
(v) there is evidence that, while local feature analysis 
may occur in the striate cortex, in the extrastriate 
cortex processing involves global configurations; 
Cvil configurational perception is indicated as being a 
precursor to local feature analysis, in that it 
organizes the data being received in the system, and 
selects data worthy of more detailed study; and 
(vii) a brief review of pattern recognition theories 
suggests that geometrical models - in which visual 
space is postulated as having a geometry and structure 
of its own, which governs the representation of 
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objects, and which emphasises the potentially 
holographic nature of those representations - may 
accurately express part of the human information-
processing system. 
In the study of these two levels of perceptual 
processing, we may see a basic distinction in what may be 
termed the traditional or analytic approach, and the 
configurational or holistic approach. In the former, we 
see an assumption that any stimulus is composed of elements 
that may be functionally defined as those stimuli which are 
objectively measurable in terms of a single physical dimension. 
Moreover, it is assumed that in processing perceptual 
information, stimuli are broken down into these elements 
and processed separately, to be recombined later according 
to some automatic additive process. On the other hand, 
the holistic approach emphasises the interdependence of 
elements. If, as Gestalt theory declares, ''the whole is 
greater than the sum of its parts", then it is clear that 
separate processing of interdependent elements will give a 
different 'answer' than integral processing. 
However, in emphasising the evidence for global 
processing, the importance of analytic processing must not 
be overlooked. It has been clearly demonstrated that 
"coherent pattern analysis breaks down in the absence of ... 
critical features" (Dodwell, 1978). It is only because the 
case for featural analysis is so well-established that the 
discussion has focussed on the evidence that such analysis 
is not the whole story. 
6.4 USING PERCEPTUAL INFORMATION FOR COGNITIVE ENDS 
The basic distinction betwee~ analytic and more 
holistic modes of processing is echoed at this level of 
processing. The classical or definitional approach to 
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human categorization assumes that categories are represented, 
and category members recognized, on the basis of necessary 
and sufficient defining features, which are ultimately 
decomposable into elements (as defined above). Similarly, 
it is assumed that processing of the constituents is 
independent, and that recombination is a matter of some 
automatic additive process. 
This traditional view has been modified somewhat over 
the years, to make allowance for the more active involvement 
of the human processor. Accordingly, the original emphasis 
on the passive learning of significant features (through 
the arbitrary association of stimuli in the processor's 
experience), changed to an emphasis on the learning of rules 
for the combination of those features. The accepted 
approach was that these rules ·were learned through a 
process of active hypothesis-testing. 
On the other hand, recent theories of categorization 
have assumed that there is " .. no logical rule or set of 
criterial features that is used to determine category 
membership. It has therefore been assumed that some probab-
ilistic or holistic rather than analytical or logical process 
is used for determining category membership" (Martin & 
Caramazza, 1980). 
Research into categorization processes in humans has 
uncovered a great deal of evidence which, in the context of 
these opposing approaches, appears contradictory. It seems 
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reasonable to suggest however, that the contradictory 
evidence is more likely to reflect faults in the theoretical 
framework within which it is interpreted, than major 
inaccuracies in the evidence. For example, there can be 
no doubt that humans, in certain circumstances, attempt 
to form rules by which stimuli can be categorised. Yet, 
with the rise of probabilistic models, we see many researchers 
simply ignoring this evidence. The argument seems to be 
that, if you can show that something (like rule-learning) 
doesn't happen in some cases, then you have shown that it 
never happens. 
The main points of the empirical evidence relating to 
how stimuli are classified and concepts formed, are 
summarized: 
(i) evidence of graded responses to category members is 
(a) interpreted to mean that category members are 
differentially representative of the category; and 
(b) interpreted as challenging definitional theory, 
which states that category members are defined by 
singly necessary and jointly sufficient features, 
and thus implies that all members are equally 
representative of the category. 
These interpretations are challenged by evidence 
that graded responses are found for categories assumed 
to be well-defined, and by the observation that 
graded responses may reflect the continuous (rather 
than discrete) nature of the component properties; 
(iil evidence that category judgements can vary between 




(a) interpreted to mean that category boundaries are 
'fuzzy', i.e. not clearly defined; and 
(b) interpreted as challenging definitional theory, 
which implicitly states that categories are 
well-defined; 
evidence that people, when asked to list category 
exemplars, list attributes not possessed by all 
exemplars of a category is 
(a) interpreted to mean that people use non-necessary 
(i.e. characteristic) properties in classifying 
stimuli; and 
(b) interpreted as challenging definitional theory, 
which states that categories are defined by 
necessary properties only; 
(iv) evidence that stored exemplars are used in making 
category judgements is 
interpreted as challenging both definitional and 
probabilistic theories, which state that category 
judgements are made on the basis of information 
contained in summary representations; and 
(v) evidence that both specific exemplars and summary 
representations are used in making category judgements 
is 
interpreted as challenging all 'pure' theories. 
Additionally,there are a number of more theoretical 
issues, of which the following are important for the present 
discussion: 
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(i) definitional tjheory is challenged by the evidence 
i 
that even well-defined concepts cannot be made to 
break down into defining componejt properties; 
(ii) probabilistic and exemplar theories are challenged 
by their failure to account for conceptual combina-
tion (the forming of complex concepts out of simple 
ones); and 
(iii) exemplar theory is weakened by its implicit require-
ment for summary information, learned as such, to be 
stored with each exemplar of the category. 
It seems clear that, for each of the general theories -
definitional, probabilistic and exemplar - one can cite 
convincing evidence for and against. It is for this reason 
that the dual theory, in which concepts are represented by 
a (definitional) core description and a (probabilistic) 
identification procedure, is becoming popular among cognitive 
theorists. However, this overlooks the evidence for 
exemplars. 
On the other hand, Medin & Schaffer's context theory 
may be thought of as a theory which 'mixes' probabilistic and 
exemplar theories. This theory enjoys some considerable 
success in accounting for phenomena of categorization, and 
has the added advantage of being the theory most compatible 
with recent theories of memory (see 6.5). It, however, 
overlooks the evidence supporting definitional theory. 
It is possible that both of these theories express 
an aspect of the processing system. If, as Dodwell suggests, 
the complexity of the human visual system is such that no 
single model will be able to explain it (Dodwell, 1982), then 
how much more is this likely to be true of the entire 
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processing system? In broad outline, the evidence would 
seem to support the idea that there are two cognitive 
processes (which may, in certain circumstances, be related 
in a way that is expressible in the terms of the dual 
theory}, which may be thought of as essentially 'definitional' 
or 'probabilistic' in nature. The fundamental assumption 
of the inductive nature of the processes, makes it clear that 
the forming of categories, whichever cognitive process is 
involved, requires the use of exemplars, at least in the 
initial stages. 
A Tentative Solution to Problems of the Holistic Approach 
It was said that the major reasons for the neglect 
of the holistic approach in theories of categorization, were 
(a) the number of representations required to be stored; 
and (b} the difficulty in accounting for how stored represen-
tations and real-world objects were compared. The beginnings 
of an answer to both these problems may perhaps be found in 
recent research into human memory. 
In an increasingly popular approach to memory (see 
Hinton & Anderson, 1981; Wicklegren, 1981, for discussion 
and review of this approach), it is assumed that information 
i$ widely distributed so that many items are stored in the 
same neural units (implicit in the neurophysiological 
evidence referred to earlier). The essential nature of 
human memory as it is espoused in this approach, is that 
memory is associative and content-addressable. The direct 
access retrieval implicit in a content-addressable store 
allows parallel processing (as opposed to the serial search 
for information necessitated by a location-addressable 
store) . 
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As Wicklegren not1s, "The more one considers the 
difficulties of serial search retrieval processes for 
recognition of any of the tens of millions df things human 
beings can recognize in a matter of seconds, the more one 
appreciates the power of par~llel processing, direct access 
retrieval systems" (Wicklegren, 1981). It is evident that 
the random serial search of a location-addressable memory 
store would be far slower than the parallel search of a 
content-addressable store - which by its nature also allows 
information to be retrieved on the basis of partial 
descriptions (Hinton & Anderson, 1981). 
An associative, content-addressable memory is clearly 
faster, more efficient, and more flexible, than the type of 
serially-processed, location-addressable memory implicit in 
traditional processing,assumptions. However, even some 
models which assume the storage of information is distributed, 
also incorporate local storage processes. It seems 
probable that in the question of local vs distributed memory 
storage, the type of information stored may be a confounding 
variable. 
In this idea of memory being associative, processed 
in parallel, and content-addressable, we see support for both 
a probabilistic cognitive process and, more directly, for 
representations of a more holistic nature. Moreover, in the 
suggestion that two types of memory storage are used, we 
see indirect support for the existence of two cognitive 
processes. 
6.5 THE EVOLUTION OF INTELLIGENCE 
The existence of two cognitive processes corresponds 
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with the two modes of perceptual processing found at each 
of the lower levels of perception. It seems reasonable to 
suggest that, as with those processes, the employment of 
the cognitive processes is determined by a number of 
stimulus; processor and task variables. This argument is 
supported by evidence from studies of stimulus classifica-
tion in non-human animals. 
The evidence from shape discrimination experiments 
(in 5.41 makes it clear that processing is not explicable 
solely in terms of the type of feature extractor mechanisms 
postulated by Hubel & Wiesel. Instead, the evidence is 
interpretable in terms .of 'definitional' theory. However, 
if there are two processes, the use of which is determined 
by task, stimulus and processor variables, then this 
experimental situation is clearly biasing the result. The 
situation is (deliberately) one in which an analytic, rule-
learning process is required. 
That this is in fact what has happened, is borne out 
by the experiments using natural concepts (discussed in 
5.4.5). The results uncovered there, strongly suggest the 
importance of stimulus variables. The role of task variables 
too, is indicated in both shape discrimination and natural 
concept experiments - in which a host of experimental design 
factors are seen to affect the results. 
It is unfortunate that the direct investigation of 
stimulus classification in non-human species, within the 
framework employed here, has been restricted to such 
artificial situations. Studies of more natural stimulus 
classification rarely answer the questions of interest to 
us. For this reason, all that can 'be provided is suggestive 
examples. 
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However, with this ~eservation, it seems reasonable 
to suggest that processing systems of divers\ natures and 
capabilities can be found among animal species, and that 
some of these processing systems seem to be based on 
similar principles as those of humans. 
As originally conceived, the classical definitional 
view of perceptual and conceptual categorization was an 
essentially passive process, not compatible with what we 
understand by 'intelligent behaviour'. Stimulus classifica-
tions which are based on this type of process may be seen 
in various stereotyped, species-typical behaviours, and 
may be termed 'discrimination' rather than 'categorization'. 
The development of coding mechanisms within the processing 
system has allowed (as suggested by Hubel & Wiesel) the 
processing of progressively more complex stimuli. 
That this type of process may allow complex and 
adaptive behaviours, has been demonstrated in various 
examples (.such as the leaf-cutting ant and the nocturnal 
moth). The inflexibility inherent in this system however, 
puts serious limits on the ~rganism's ability to survive 
environmental change. 
Jerison (.1973) has suggested two important dimensions 
underlie intelligent behaviour: 
{i) the extent to which specific sensory capacities have 
been developed as specific to adaptive niches 
occupied by a species; and 
(ii)_ the extent to which behaviour in response to sensory 
information is flexible and adjustable to inconsis-
tencies in that information. 
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We may relate this to a distinction that may be 
made between animals with narrowband sensory filters 
('specialists') and those with wideband sensory filters 
('generalists'} (Ewert, 1980) . Specialization allows 
stimulus identification to occur at the level of the 
receptor membrane (as in bat-call recognition in nocturnal 
moths). Wideband sensory filters on the other hand, do 
not allow stimulus identification to be a purely peripheral 
function. Generalists require a processing system of 
greater complexity. 
It is also clear that specialized input systems are 
inadequate if the animal lives in a variety pf subenvironments 
or a highly unpredictable environment (Ewert, 1980). It 
is the heterogeneity of the environment that demands systems 
capable of responding to a wide variety of sensory stimuli. 
It was the increasing demands on the info,rmation 
processing system which led from the use of a processing 
system in which stimulus classification is based on single 
units responsive to 'releasing stimuli', to the development 
of a mechanism whereby the outputs of the~e single units can 
be combined according to some additive computation, and then 
to the development of a mechanism which allows the active 
involvement of the organism in the process. From this comes 
the evolution of the 'definitional' cognitive process, 
expressed in the active selection of significant features, 
and the formation of 'rules' for how those features are 
combined. 
However, studies of perceptual and conceptual 
processes in animals uncover many examples of behaviours 
which do not seem readily interpretable within this frame-
work. In particular, it seems evident that animals can 
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perceive complex stimuli as in,egrated wholes. Stimulus 
classification clearly doesn't 'always require an analytic 
process. If patterns and objects can be recognizld without 
analysis, it implies that the stored representations are 
holographic in nature. The process whereby these 
holistically perceived objects are compared with these 
holographic representations is clearly not one which can 
be expressed in the terms of the 'definitional' approach. 
Instead, comparison must be on the basis of some similarity 
judgement, in line with the 'probabilistic' approach. 
It is clear that this type of processing is consid-
erably more flexible than the 'definitional' cognitive 
process. Moreover, it seems likely that the nature of the 
'definitional' process is such as to put much greater 
limits on the capacity of the information processing 
system. Thus, it is postulated that; although a 
'definitional' cognitive process can underlie intelligent 
behaviour, the capacity for intelligent behaviour is far 
less if the animal has this type of processing system 
only. In other words, the potential for intelligence is 
significantly greater in an animal who possesses a dual 
processing system. 
It is probable that a dual processing system exists 
in most, if not all, mammals, birds and cephalopods. Animals 
who use a definitional cognitive process only, are probably 
found widely among fish and amphibians. Most invertebrates 
probably only possess a passive process. 
It is not suggested that dual processing systems are 
all identical. As within the other broadly classified 
processing systems, the specific systems vary in complexity, 
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capacity or structure. The details must await research 
which is specifically directed towards this question. The 
evidence available at the present time is barely adequate 
to use as a basis for this speculative theory. 
REFERENCES 
\ 
Anderson, J.R. (1980). Cognitive psychology and its 
implications. San Francisco: W.H. Freeman & Co. 
133 
Anish, D.S. (1978). The natural concept tree: A study on 
learning in pigeons. Undergraduate Honours thesis, 
Harvard College. 
Armstrong, S.L., Gleitman, L.R. & Gleitman, H. (1983). 
What some concepts might not be. Cognition, 13, 
263-308. 
Barlow, H.B. (1953}. Summation and inhibition in the frog's 
retina. Journal of Physiology, 119, 69-88. 
Benson, D.F. & Greenberg, J.P. (1969). Visual form agnosia. 
Archives of Neurology,~' 82-89. 
Bindra, D. (1976). A theory of intelligent behaviour. 
New York: John Wiley & Sons. 
Blank, A.A. (1958). Analysis of experiments in binocular 
space perception. Journal of the Optical Society 
of America, 48, 911-925. 
Blough, D.S. (1961). The shape of some wavelength general-
ization gradients. Journal of the Experimental 
Analysis of Behaviour, 4, 31-40. 
Blough, D.S. (1979). Effects of number and form of stimuli 
on visual search in the pigeon. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Animal Behaviour Processes,~' 211-223. 
Bourne, L.E. (1982). Typicality effects in logically defined 
categories. Memory & Cognition, 10(1), 3-9. 
Bower, T.G.R. (1966}. Heterogeneous Summation in Human 
Infants. Animal Behaviour, 14, 395-398. 
Bowman, R. & Sutherland, N.S. (1969). Discrimination of 
"W" and "V" shapes by goldfish. Quarterly Journal of 
Experimental Psychology, 21, 69-76. 
Bowman, R.S. & Sutherland, N.S. (1970). Shape discrimination 
by goldfish: coding of irregularities. Journal of 
Comparative & Physiological Psychology, 7.l:._, 90-97. 
Brooks, L.R. (l978). Nonanalytic concept formation and memory 
for instances. In Cognition and Categorisation. 
(Eds.} Rosch, E. & Lloyd, B.B., Hillsdale, N.J.: 
Erlbaum. 
Brown, J.L. (1975) The evolution of behaviour. New York: 
W.W. Norton & Co. 
134 
Brzoska, J. & Schneider, H. (1978). Behav~or Process, 3, 
125-136. Cited in Ewert, J. (1980).~euroethology. 
New York: Springer-Verlag. 
\ 
Burns, B.D. & Smith, G.K. (1962). Transmission of informatioti 
in the unanesthetized cat's isolated forebrain. 
In Journal of Physiology, 164, 238-251. 
Caelli, T.M. (1974}. Models, Lie algebras and visual pattern 
perception. Ph.D. dissertation, University of 
Newcastle, Australia. 
Caelli, T.M. (1977). Psychophysical interpretations and 
experimental evidence for the LTG/NP theory of 
perception. Cahiers Psychologie, ~, 107-134. 
Campbell, F.W. (1974). The transmission o,f spatial information 
·· through the visual system. In The Neurosciences: 
Third Study Volume. (Eds.) Schmitt, F.O. & Worden, 
F.G. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 
Campbell, F.W. & Robson, J.G. (1968). Application of Fourier 
analysis to the visibility of gratings. Journal of 
Physiology, 197, 557-566. 
Capranica, R.R. (1965). The evoked vocal response of the 
bullfrog: A study of communication by sound. 
M.I.T. Research Monograph, ll, 1-110. 
Cerella, J. ( 1977) . 
the pigeon. 
Absence of perspective processing in 
Pattern Recognition,~, 65-68. 
Cerella, J. (19~9). Visual classes and natural categories 
in the pigeon. Human Perception and Performance, 
5 (.1), 68-77. 
Cerella, J. (1982). Mechanisms of concept formation in the 
pigeon. In Analysis of Visual Behavior. (Eds.) 
. Ingle, D., Goodale, M. & Mansfield, R. Cambridge, 
Mass.: MIT Press. 
Cronly-Dillon, J.R., Sutherland, N.S. & Wolfe, J.B. (1966). 
Intraretinal transfer of a learned visual shape 
discrimination in goldfish after section and regenera-
tion of the optic nerve brachia. Experimental 
Neurology, 15, 455-462. 
Darwin, C. (1904). The formation of vegetable mould through 
the action of worms with observations on their habits. 
London: John Murray. 
Denny, M.R. (1980). Comparative psychology: an evolutionary 
analysis of animal behavior. New York: John Wiley 
& Sons. 
Dineen, J. & Keating, E.G. (1979). Demonstration of complex 
pattern vision in the monkey completely lacking 
striate cortex. _S_o_c_i_e_t~y,.__f_o_r_N_e_u_r_o_s_c_i_e_n_c_e_Ab _ s_t_r_a_c_t_s , 
5, 782. 
Dodwell~ P.C. (1970). Visual pattern recognition. 
New York: Holt Rinehart Winston. 
I 
Dodwell, ~.C. (1978). Human perception of patterns and 
objects. Handbook of Sensory Physiology VIII 
Perception. (Eds.) Held, R., Leibowitz, H.W. & 
Teuber, H. New York: Springer-Verlag. 
Dodwell, P.C. (19821. Geometrical approaches to visual 
processing. In Analysis of Visual Behavior. 
(Eds.) Ingle, D., Goodale, M. & Mansfield, R. 
Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 
Drees, 0. (1952). Untersuchungen iiber die angeborenen 
Verhaltensweisen bei Springspinnen (Salticidae). 
Zeitschrift fuer Tierpsychologie, f, 169-209. 
135 
Dru, D., Walker, J~P. & Walk~f, J.B. (1975). Self-produced 
locomotion restores visual capacity after striate 
lesions. Science, 187, 265-266. 
Erickson, R.P. (1963). Sensory neural patterns and 
gustation. In Olfaction and taste. (Ed.) Zotterman, Y. 
New York: Pergamon Press. 
Ewert, J. (1980). Neuroethology. New York: Springer-Verlag. 
,, 
Ewert, J. (1982). Neuronal basis of configurational prey 
selection in the common toad. In Analysis of Visual 
Behavior. (Eds.) Ingle, n., Goodale, M. & Mansfield, 
R. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 
Ewert, J. & von Seelen, W. (1974). Kybernitik, 14, 167-183. 
Cited in Ewert, J. (1980). Neuroethology.New York: 
Springer-Verlag. 
Faley, R.H. & Alkon, D.A. (1985). Cellular mechanisms of 
learning. Annual Review of Psychology,~, 236-269. 
Ferraro, D. & Grisham, M. (1972). Discrimination and 
generalization of complex visual shape variations in 
pigeons. Perceptual & Motor Skills, 35, 915-927. 
Foard, C.F. & Nelson, D.G.K. (1984). Holistic and analytic 
modes of processing: The multiple determinants of 
perceptual analysis. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: General, 113(1), 94-111. 
Fodor, J.A., Garrett, M.F., Walker, E.T. & Parkes, C. 
(1980}. Against definitions. Cognition, ~' 1-105. 
Fodor, J.A. & Katz, J.J. (1963). The structure of a semantic 
theory. Language, l2_, 170-210. 
Forster, L.M. (1979a). Visual mechanisms of hunting behaviour 
in Trite planiceps, a jumping spider (Araneae: 
Salticidae). N.Z. Journal of Zoology,~' 79-93. 
Forster, L.M. (1979b). Comparative aspects of the behavioural 
biology of some N.Z. jumping spiders. Ph.D. thesis, 
University of Otago. 
136 
Frishkopf, L.S., Capranica, R.R. & Goldstein, Jr., M.H. 
(1968). Neural coding in the bullfrog's auditory 
system - a teleological approach. Proceedings of 
the IEEE,~, 969-980. 
Ganz, L. ·& Wilson, P.D. (1967). Innate generalization of a 
form discrimination without contouring eye movements. 
Journal of Comparative Physiology & Psychology, 63, 
258-269. -
Glezer, V.D., Ivanoff, V.A. & Tscherbach, T.A. (1973). 
Investigation of complex and hypercomplex receptive 
fields of visual cortex of the cat as spatial 
frequency filters. Vision Research, 13, 1875-1904. 
Gribbin, J. & Cherfas, J. (1982). The Monkey Puzzle. 
London: The Bodley Head Ltd. 
Griffith, H. & Davidson, M. (1966). Long-term changes in 
intellect and behaviour after hemispherectomy. 
Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery & Psychiatry,~, 
571-576. 
Griisser, O.J. & Griisser-Cornehls, U. (1968). Vision Research, 
8, 1173-1185. Cited in Ewert, J. (1980) .Neuroethology. 
New York: Springer-Verlag. 
Hailman, J.P. (1962). Pecking of laughing gull chicks to 
models of the parental head. Auk, ?.J._, 89-98. 
Hailman, J.P. (1964). Coding of the colour preference of the 
gull chick. Nature, 204, 710. 
Hailman, J.P. (1967). The ontogeny of an instinct: the 
pecking response in chicks of the laughing gull 
(Larus atricilla, L.) and related species. 
Behaviour, Suppl. 15. 
Hailman, J.P. (1970). Comments on the coding of releasing 
stimuli. In Development and evolution of behavior. 
(Eds.) Aronson, L.R., Tobach, E., Lehrman, D.S. & 
Rosenblatt, J.S. San Francisco: W.H. Freeman & Co. 
Hebb, D.O. (1949). Organization of behavior. New York: 
John Wiley. 
Heinemann, E.G. & Kadison, K. (1976). Control of pigeon's 
choice behavior by position of luminance of a spot 
of light. Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society, 2, 
522-524. 
Herrnstein, R.J. (1979). Acquisition, generalisation, and 
discrimination reversal of a natural concept. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior 
Processes, 5(2), 116-129. 
Herrnstein, R.J. (1982). Stimuli and the texture of 
experience. Neuroscience & Biobehavioural Reviews, 
~, 105-117. 
Herrnstein, R.J. & deVilliers, P.A. (1980). Fish as a 
natural category for people and pigeons. 
In The ~s cholo of Learning and Motivation, 
137 
Vol.14. (Ed. G.H. New York: Academic Press. 
Herrnstein, R.J. & Loveland, D.H. (L964). Complex visual 
concept in the pigeon. Science, 146, 549-551. 
Herrnstein, R.J., Loveland, D.H. & Cable, C. (1976). 
Natural concepts in pigeons. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes,~, 285-302. 
Hinton, G.E. & Anderson, J.A. 
of associative memory. 
(Eds.) ( 19 81) . Parallel models 
Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum. 
Hochberg, J. (1968). In the mind's eye. In Contemporary 
Theory and Research in Visual Perception. (Ed.) 
Haber, R.N. New York: Holt Rinehart Winston. 
Hoffman, W.C. (1966). The Lie algebra of visual perception. 
In Journal of Mathematical Psychology, l, 65-98. 
Hoffman, W.C. (1971). Visual illusions of angle as an 
application of Lie transformation groups, S.I.A.M. 
Review, 13, 169-184. 
Hoffman, W.C. (1977). An informal, historical description 
(with bibliography) of the 'L.T.G./N.P. 1 
Cahiers Psychologie, ~, 135-174. 
Homa, D., Sterling, S. & Trepel, L. (1981). Limitations of 
exemplar-based generalization and the abstraction 
of categorical information. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Human Learning & Memory, 7(6), 418-439. 
Hubel, D.H. & Wiesel, T.N. (1962). Receptive fields, 
binocular interaction and functional architecture in 
the cat's visual cortex. Journal of Physiology, 
160, 106-154. 
Hubel, D.H. & Wiesel, T.N. (1965). Receptive fields and 
functional architecture in two nonstriate visual 
areas (18 and 19) of the cat. Journal of 
Neurophysiology,~, 229-289. 
Hubel, D.H. & Wiesel, T.N. (1968). Receptive fields and 
functional architecture of monkey striate cortex. 
Journal of Physiology, 195, 215-243. 
Hughes, H.C. (1977). Anatomical and neurobehavioral 
investigations concerning the thalamo-cortical 
organization of the rat's visual system. Journal of 
Comparative Neurology, 175, 311-336. 
Hughes, H.C. (1982). Search for the neural mechanisms 
essential to basic figural synthesis in the cat. 
In Analysis of Visual Behavior. (Eds.) Ingle, D., 
Goodale, M. & Mansfield, R. Cambridge, Mass.: 
MIT Press. 
138 
Humphrey, N.R. (f974). Vision in a monkey without striate 
cortex:~ case study. Perception,~, 241-255. 
Hunt, E. (l980). 
concept:. 
Intelligence as d.n information-processing 
British Journal ot\ Psychology, 71, 449-474. 
Jerison, H.J. (1973). Evolution of the brain and intelligence. 
New York: Academic Press. 
John, E.R. & Schwartz, E.L. (1978). The neurophysiology of 
information processing and cognition. Annual Review 
of Psychology,~, 1-29. 
Katz, J.J. (1972). Semantic Theory. New York: Harper & Row. 
Katz, J.J. (1977). The real status of semantic representa-
tions. Linguistic Inquiry, 8(3), 559-584. 
Keating, E.G. (1975). Effects of prestriate striate 
lesions on the monkey's ability to locate and 
discriminate visual forms. Experiments in Neurology, 
Q, 16-25. 
Kellogg, R.T. (1981). Feature frequency in concept learning: 
What is counted? Memory & Cognition,~, 157-163. 
Kruglikov, R.I. (1978). [The structural and functional 
organization of the brain in memory processes]. 
Vop. Filosof., 1, 96. Cited in Shvyrkov, V.B. (1981). 
The unity of the physiological and the psychological 
in behavior. Soviet Psychology, 20(3), 36-57. 
Kuhl, P.K. & Miller, J.D. (1975). Speech perception by the 
chinchilla: voiced-voiceless distinction in alveolar 
plosive consonants. Science, 190, 69-72. 
Land, M.F. (1969). Structure of the retinae of the principal 
eyes of jumping spiders (Salticidae: Dendryphantinae) 
in relation to visual optics. Journal of Experimental 
Biology, 51, 443-470. 
Lettvin, J ~, Maturana, H., Pitts, W. & McCulloch, W.S. 
(1958). What the frog's eye tells the frog's brain. 
Proceedingsof the I.R.E., Q, 1940-1951. 
Lindsay, P.H. & Norman, D.A. (1972). Human inforrnation-
processing: an introduction to psychology. New 
York: Academic Press. 
Lubow, R.E. (1974). High-order concept formation in the 
pigeon. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of 
Behavior, 21, 475-483. 
Mackintosh, J. & Sutherland, N.S. (1962). Visual discrimination 
by the goldfish: The orientation of rectangles. 
Animal Behaviour, 11(1), 135-141. 
Malott, R.W. & Siddall, J.W. (1972). Acquisition of the 
people concept in pigeons. Psychological Reports, 
31, 3-13. 
139 
Marr, D. (l976). Early processing of visual information. 
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society 
of London, B275, 483-524. 
Martin, R.C. & Cararnazza, A. (1980). Classification in 
well-defined and ill-defined categories: Evidence 
for common processing strategies. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: General, 109(3), 320-353. 
Medin, D.L. & Schaffer, M.M. (1978). Context theory of 
classification learning. Psychology Review, 85(3), 
207-238. 
Mervis, C.B. & Rosch, E. (1981). Categorization of natural 
objects. Annual Review of Psychology, E, 89-115. 
Miller, G.A. & Johnson-Laird, P.N. (1976). Language and 
perception. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press. 
Miller, G .A. & Nicely, P. (1955) . An analysis of perceptual 
confusions among some English consonants. Journal of 
the Acoustical Society of America,'!:]__, 338-353. 
Moray, N. (1959). Attention in dichotic listening: Affective 
cues and the influence of instruction. Quarterly 
Journal of Experimental Psychology, 11, 56-60. 
Morgan, M.J., Fitch, M.D., Holman, J.G. & Lea, S.E.G. 
(1976). Pigeons learn the concept of an 'A'. 
Perception,~, 57-66. 
'Muntz, W.R.A. (1962). Effectiveness of different colors of 
light in releasing the positive phototactic behavior 
of frogs, and a possible function of the retinal 
projection to the diencephalon. Journal of Neuro-
physiology, 25, 712-720. 
Muntz, W.R.A. (l963). The development of phototaxis in the 
frog. (Rana temporaria). Journal of Experimental 
Biology, i.Q_, 371-379. 
Neisser, U. (1967}. Cognitive psychology. New York: 
Appleton-Century-Crofts. 
Osherson, D.N. & Smith, E.E. (1981). On the adequacy of 
prototype theory as a theory of concepts. Cognition, 
2_, 35-58. 
Pomerantz, J.P., Soyer, L.C. & Stoever, R.J. (1977). 
Perception of wholes and their component parts: 
Some configural superiority effects. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Human Perception & 
Performance,~, 422-435. 
Poole, J. & Lander, D.G. (1971). The pigeon's concept of 
pigeon. Psychonomic Science,~, 157-158. 
Premack, D. (1978). 




On the abstractness of human concepts: 
be difficult to talk to a pigeon. 
Processes in Animal Behavior. (Eds.) 
Fowler, H. & Honig, W. Hillsdale, N.J.: 
Premac~, D. (1983}. Animal cognition. 
jPsychology, 34, 351-362. 
Annual Review of 
Ramos, A., Schwartz, E.L.\ & John, E.R. (1976). Evoked 
potential unit rel~tionships in behaving cats. 
Brain Research Bulletin, !, 69-75. 
Reed, E.S. (1982). Darwin's earthworms: A Case study in 
evolutionary psychology. Behaviourism, 10(2), 
164-185. 
140 
Reynolds, G.S. (1961). Contrast, generalization, and the 
process of discrimination .. Journal of the 
Experimental Analysis of Behavior,!, 289-294. 
Robson, J.G. (1975). Receptive fields: Neural representation 
of the spatial and intensive attributes of the visual 
image. In Handbook or Perception, Vol. 5, (Eds.) 
Carterette, E.C. & Friedman, M.P. New York: Academic 
Press. 
Roeder, K.D. (1966). Auditory system of noctuid moths. 
Science, 154, 1515-1521. 
Rosch, E. (1977). Human categorization. 
Cross-Cultural Psychology, Vol.l. 
New York: Academic Press. 
In Studies in 
(Ed.) Warren, N. 
Rosch, E. & Lloyd, B.B. (Eds.) (1978). Cognition and 
Categorisation. Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum. 
Ryan, M.J. & Tuttle, M.D. (1981). Bat predation and the 
evolution of frog vocalizations in the neotropics. 
Science, 214, 677-678. 
Ryan, M.J. & Tuttle, M.D. (1983). The ability of the frog-
eating bat to discriminate among novel and potentially 
poisonous frog species using acoustic cues. 
Animal Behavior, 31,.827-833. 
Schmerler, S. & Hailman, J.P. (1965). Discrimination of 
orientation in the Laughing Gull, Larus atricilla L. 
American Zoologist,~, 655. 
Sekular, R. (1974). Spatial vision. Annual Review of 
Psychology,~' 195-232. 
Shvyrkov, V.B. (1981). The unity of the physiological and 
the psychological in behavior. Soviet Psychology, 
20 (3), 36-57. 
Siegel, R.K. & Honig, W.K. (1970). Pigeon concept formation: 
Successive and simultaneous acquisition. Journal of 
the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 13, 385-390. 
Sprague, J.M. (1966). Interaction of cortex and superior 
colliculus in mediation of visually guided behavior 
in the cat. Science, 153, 1544-1547. 
141 
Sprague, J.M., Levy, J., DiBerardino, A. & Berlucchi, G. 
(l977). Visual cortical areas mediating form 
discrimination in the cat. Journal of Comparative 
Neurology, 172, 441-488. 
Smith, E.E. & Medin, D.L. (1981). Categories and concepts. 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 
Sutherland, N.S. (1968). Outlines of a theory of visual 
pattern recognition in animals and man. Proceedings 
of the Royal Society, Bl71, 297-317. 
Sutherland, N.S. (1969). Shape discrimination in rat, 
octopus, and goldfish: A comparative study. Journal 
of Comparative & Physiological Psychology, 67(2), 
160-176. 
Sutherland, N.S. & Bowman, R. (1969). Discrimination of 
circles and squares with and without knobs by 
goldfish. Quarterly Journal of Experimental 
Psychology, 21, 330-338. 
Tinbergen, N. (1968). Curious naturalists. New York: 
Doubleday & Co. 
Towe, A.L. (1954). A study of figural equivalence .in the 
pigeon. Journal of Comparative & Physiological 
Psychology, 47, 283-287. 
Vetter, G.H. & Hearst, E. (1968). Generalization and 
discrimination of shape orientation in the pigeon. 
Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 
ll, 753-765. 
Watson, A. (1978). A Riemann geometric explanation of the 
visual illusions and figural after effects. 
In Formal Theories of Visual Perception. (Eds.) 
Leeuwenberg, E. & Buffart, H. New York: John Wiley 
& Sons. 
Wells, M.J. (1962). Early learning in Sepia. Symposia 
of the Zoological Society of London,~' 149-169. 
Whitney, P. & Kellas, G. (1984). Processing category terms 
in context: Instantiation and the structure of 
semantic categories. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Learning, Memory & Cognition, 10(1), 
95-l03. 
Wickelgren, W.A. (1981). Human learning and memory. 
Annual Review of Psychology,~' 21-52. 
Wilkinson, F.E. & Dodwell, P.C. (1980). Young kittens can 
learn complex visual pattern discriminations. 
Nature, 284, 258-259. 
Young, J.Z. (1981). The Life of Vertebrates. 3rd ed. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Zajaczkowska, A. (1956). Experimental determination of 
Luneburg' s constants a and K. Quarterly Journal of 
Experimental Psychology,~' 66-78. 
